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INTRODUCTION

The present article is intended to provide a comprehensive review
of developments in criminal law affecting state prosecutions during
Beyond an elucidation of case holdings, an effort will

the past year.'

be made to evaluate decisions in terms of their consistency with constitutional mandates and analogous cases from other jurisdictions.
Doubtless the most significant decision affecting substantive criminal law was Kirkwood v. Ellington," declaring a portion of the Tennessee

vagrancy statute

unconstitutional. 3

Procedurally,

the United

4

States Supreme Court decision in Chimel v. California is likely to
have as profound an impact on police investigations as any recent
holding.;-

Search

and seizure generally 6 and various aspects of the

7
privilege against self-incrimination were the most frequently discussed
problems. Of local interest was Johnson v. Avery, s reservedly upholding the activities of "jailhouse lawyers" in Tennessee. 9 Finally, the in-

frequently

used

thirteenth

servitude was resorted
iniprisonment

costs."

under

Beyond

these

amendment

prohibition

of

involuntary

to in Anderson v. Ellington'O to invalidate
a state statute
most notables,

for the non-payment
numerous

of court

decisions served

to

further delineate the vague penumbras of procedural safeguards.

1. For purposes of convenience, coverage has been limited to those decisions which
appeared in advance sheets of the National Reporter System during 1969. As a
result, some 1968 decisions are the subject of discussion, and, conversely, a
number of decisions rendered during the past year were not yet published. In
the latter case, some decisions had appeared in abbreviated form in the CRIMINAL
LAw REPORTER [hereinafter cited CRIM. L. REP.], and these are frequently
noted under appropriate categories.
2. 298 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Tcnn. 1969).
3..,ee pp. 448-49 infra.
4. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
5. See p. 476 infra.
6.See pp. 472-80 infra.
7. See pp. 459-64 infra.
8. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
9. See pp. 481-82 infra.
10. 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
11.See pp. 497-98 infra.
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OFFENSES

A. Against Person
1. Murder. Few concepts of substantive criminal law are more
ephemeral than the notion of "malice aforethought," or, as it is frequently abbreviated, "malice," an essential element in any charge of
murder.' 2 A reasonably precise delineation of the term is desirable
since, at least in charges of first degree murder, malice is an element
3
on equal footing with willfulness, deliberateness, and premeditation,1
and it may be presumed that each of these conditions of the mind
is to be independently established. The question of the presence of
malice arose in three cases during the past year. In Simpson v.
State, 14 the defendant became disgruntled after waiting in a cafe
fifteen minutes to be served a beer. He moved to a front booth where
others were seated, took a pistol from his pocket, and asked one of
the men, "Do you believe I'll blow your brains out?" The deceased
mistakenly responded, "No." The defendant was convicted of second
15
degree murder.
In Brown v. State, 16 the defendant was the operator of a junk
yard. Late one afternoon the victim, a fifteen-year old, accompanied
by two of his friends, had mechanical difficulties with the automobile
he was driving and maneuvered it to the side of the street adjoining
the property of the defendant. From past experience, the victim
knew that the automobile only needed to cool off. The three sat in
the vehicle and talked for about twenty minutes. While the victim
was outside the automobile checking it, the defendant and an employee approached the vehicle, the defendant carrying a shotgun. He
yelled twice to the victim to stop, whereupon the latter became
frightened and attempted to re-enter the vehicle. The defendant fired
the shotgun, hitting the victim, who managed to get into the rear
seat of the car. The defendant fired again, breaking out the rear
window and hitting the victim in the head. The testimony of the defendant was to the effect that he had experienced substantial losses
by way of theft, that the victim was engaged in stealing five-gallon
buckets of plumbing fixtures at the time he ordered him to stop. He
12. TENN. CODE ANN.
13. Id. at § 39-2401.

§ 39-2401

(1955).

14. 437 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
15. After fatally shooting the victim in the face, "the defendant turned to one
Youngblood and asked him, 'Do you believe I'll blow your brains out?' Youngblood answered, 'Yes, I sho' do.' The defendant told him, 'I'm going to let
you live.'" Id. at 539. The defendant again ordered beer and was promptly
served.
16. 441 S.W.2d 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
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was convicted of assault with intent to commit second degree murder. 17
The defendant in Fox v. State' s was a forty-nine-year-old woman
who had been repeatedly disturbed by burglars and prowlers at night
while her husband was working at a nearby service station. On the
night in question, two boys, one ten years old and the other thirteen,
entered the defendant's yard to catch an opossum that had escaped
from them. Upon hearing her dog barking, the defendant peered
through her bedroom window and observed someone in the back
yard. She thereupon took a pistol and went to her front porch, without taking her glasses and without turning on the porch light. At
this time the older boy was walking from the rear of the yard to the
front to request permission to pursue the opossum further into her
property. Whe'n he was about three feet from the porch, the defendant began firing "in a generally wild and indiscriminate manner."
One bullet hit the older boy in the knee; another hit the younger
boy in the head, killing him. The defendant did not know either
of the boys and testified "that she was scared and afraid and only
shot to scare what she thought were burglars." She was convicted of
second degree murder.
In all three cases the convictions were affirmed. Initially it should
be noted that malice will be presumed where a deadly weapon is
used.' '! This, however, is only a lresumltion, and may be rebutted
by dhe defendant. 2' 1 By and large, discussions of the nature of malice
have been sparse, and frequently confusing. For exanple, in the Fox
case, the court said, "Malice is an intent to (1o an injury to another,
a design formed in the mind of doing mischief to another.'' "2 First,
it is worthy of mention that malice as a concept in criminal law is
not confined to homicide cases, 22 and thus the "injury to another"
phrasing will at times be inapplicable.23 Further, assuming the court
is only speaking of malice for purposes of homicide, the use of "in17. This is a lesser included offense of TENN, CODE ANN. § 39-604 (1955).
18. 441 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
19. Foster %. State. 74 Tenn. 213 (1880); Lewis v. Slate, 202 Tenn. 328, 304 S.W.2d
322 (1957); Neely v. State, 210 Tenn. 52, 356 S.A.2d 401 (1962); Cooper v.
State, 210 Tenn. 63, 356 S.W.2d 457 (1962); McClain %. State, 445 S.W.2d 942
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
20. See Smith v. State, 212 Tenn. 510, 370 S.W.2d 543 (1963); Logan v. State, 5
CRIM. L. REP. 2067 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
21. 441 S.W.2d at 495.
22. See, e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-609 (1955) (mayhem); §§ 39-501 to 504 (1963),
§ 39-507 (1955)(arson): § 39-2701 (1955)(libel).
23. For example, a person may be found guilty of arson in the act of burning his
own property. Id. at §§ 39-501 to 503.
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tent" in the definition would place the court in an embarrassing position had it been called upon to discuss the concept of "willfulness"
in

the same opinion, as the latter concept

is generally

considered

4
synonymous with "intent.''2
Professor Perkins defines malice aforethought as "an unjustifiable,
inexcusable and tnmitigated man-endangering-state-of-mind," 2 5 and
notes that such may exist without an actual intent to kill.26 Wharton
makes no attempt at pinpointing the concept, suggesting simply that
malice aforethought "comprehends a number of different conditions

of mind."-

7

Tennessee decisions use such descriptive phrases

as "an

intent to do an unlawful act which may probably result in depriving the party of life,'' 2 8 ' "an evil design," 2 "''a malignant heart,'' 3 0 and
"a heart regardless of social duty."3 1
In the final analysis malice aforethought can only be understood
by a perusal of the cases in which the subject has been in issue. A
32
pair of early decisions provide the best comparison. In Ann v. State
the defendant was a slave entrusted with the care of the infant child
of her master. Apparently to the end of pursuing a tryst with her
paramotur. she administered a quantity of laudanum to the child for
the purpose of inducing sleep.3a The child died from the dosage
about four hours later. The conviction of the defendant for murder
was reversed because of improper jury instructions. The court held
that, if the defendant was wholly ignorant of the poisonous propensity
24. See I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 268 (Anderson ed. 1957)
[hereinafter cited WIAR'ION].
25. PERKINS, CRIMINAlI
LAW 48 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited PERKINS]. And see

generally Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537
(1934).
26. PERKINS at 35-36. "An intent to kill, to give a very limited illustration, may
be the same intent, in a certain sense, whether it is for self-preservation, or is

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

formed in a sudden rage engendered by great provocation, or is part of a
well-laid plan for financial gain; but the psychical fact in its totality is not
the same in any two of these." Id. at 47.
1 W\THARrON § 523.
Ann v. State, 30 Tenn. 159 (1850): Travers v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S.W.
1041 (1891).
Ann v. State, 30 Tenn. 159 (1850).
Ann v. State, 30 Tenn. 159 (1850); Lee v, State, 41 Tenn. 37 (1860); Travers v.
State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S.W. 1041 (1891). Professor Perkins finds this language
"more suggestive of cardiac tumor than a state of mind." PERKINS at 770.
Lee v. State, 41 Tenn. 37 (1860).
30 Tenn. 159 (1850).
Laudanum is "the alcoholic tincture of opium." 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
807 (1968). The Ann decision implicitly held that laudanum would have been
harmless to the child if properly administered. See also Higbee v. Guardian
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 66 Barb.

(N.Y.) 462 (1873),

cepted as a medical remedy for headaches.

where laudanum is ac-
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of the substance and did not have as her purpose to injure the child
34
in any way, it could not be said that the killing was malicious.
In Lee v. State,35 the defendant was driving a hack drawn by two

horses which ran over and killed a small boy crossing a street. It appeared that the defendant had made no effort to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the entreaties of bystanders. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. In affirming the conviction, the court gratuitously observed that "A more proper conviction would have been,
for uUrder. ' a
In discussing the requisite nalice for murder, the
court said:
If persons in pursuit of their lawful and common occupations
see danger probably arising to others from their acts, and yet
persist, without giving sufficient warning of the danger, the
death which ensues will be murder. Thus, if workmen throwing stones, rubbish, or other things from a house, in the ordinary
course of their business, happen to kill a person underneath, the
question will be whether they deliberately saw the danger, or
betrayed any consciousness of it. If they did, and yet gave no
warning, a general malignity of heart may be inferred and the
act will amount to murder, from its gross impropriety.3 7
Returning to the three principal cases, the presence of malice in
the Simpson case requires no discussion. Clearly the facts here reflect "an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated man-endangering-state-of-mind," and would without difficulty fit any other accepted
definition of malice. The Brown case is a little more difficult. The
contention of the defendant that lie was merely protecting his property
is worthy of consideration in the determination of malice,35 though
his testimony suggested "an evil design.''3
However, any presumption
of good faith on the part of the defendant was wholly erased when
he fired the second shot, hitting the victim in the head, after he was
40
seated inside the vehicle.
34. -If the prisoner's purpose really was, to superinduce a state of temporary
quietude or sleep, without more. in order to afford better opportunity, or

35.
36.

37.
38.

greater facility, for carrying on her own illicit intercourse with Tom. this,
however culpable in morals, would not involve her in the guilt of murder."
30 Tenn. at 165.
41 Tenn. 42 (1860).
Id. at 66. Malice may also be found in the operation of a muotor vehicle, see
Shorter v. State, 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S.W. 985 (1922). particularly where the
defendant is intoxicated. Rogers v. State. 196 Tenn. 263, 265 S.W.2d 559 (1954);
Edwards v. State, 202 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 500 (1957).
41 Teun. at 46-47.
But see text accompanying notes 110-13 infra.

39. "His attitude in the whole matter is expressed in his testimony: 'I think it

an awful good remedy.
40. Id. at 489.

It must have got the job done.'"

is

441 S.V.2d at 487.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
Fox is the most diffictult of the three cases.
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Notwithstanding the

defendant's testimony that she was induced by fear to fire the shots,
41
testimony of other witnesses indicated a more malevolent attitude.
In concluding that malice was present, the court took special cognizance of these facts:
4 -2

home;

(2)

(1) the defendant was in the safety of her own

she could have called

the police, who had responded

within a few minutes to such calls in the past, and/or her husband,
who was working only 225 feet away; (3) she failed to turn on the
43
outside light in an effort to identify the source of the disturbance,
and

(4) she failed to use her glasses, the absence of which, she testi44
lied. tendered her practically blind.
B. Against Property
I. Laru'ny. An essential element of the common law crime of
larceny is "asportation" of the property taken, and this is likewise a
41.

An investigating officer quoted the defendant as saying, "I didn't miss him this
time. I hit him right in the head." 441 S.W.2d at 494. Another witness "said
he heard the defendant say she shot the boys because they were making a
race track through her yard." Id.
42. Smith v. State, 212 Tenn. 510, 370 S.W.2d 543 (1963), relied upon by the
defendant, was found distinguishable on this point. There the defendant, a
night watchman at a school, was excited by a figure approaching him in the
dark with a flashlight. He fired seven shots, ran from the building locking
the door behind him, and hysterically reported the incident to the police. The
court there found an absence of malice and concluded that the defendant could
be guilty of nothing greater than involuntary manslaughter.
43. It may be suggested that this factor is of ambiguous significance: If the light
only illuminated the porch, then it actually would be more difficult to see into
the yard from the porch after turning the light on. Further, if the defendant's
claim of fear is accepted, the light would have the effect of exposing her presence, while blinding her to movements beyond the porch.
44. The yet- unreported case, Yarbrough v. State, 4 CR1si. L. REP. 2363 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Jan. 17, 1969), takes note of the distinction between intent, required for
murder, and premeditation. required only for first degree murder. "It was only
after the drunken deceased, justifiably or not, caused Nesbitt to fall from the
porch by striking at him, did the rage of the apparently equally drunken
Nesbitt and his co-defendant friends rise quickly to the boiling point of
murder. . . . In short, the bloody, senseless, brutal butchery of the deceased
was clearly the mad, irrational, malicious, savage, intentional acts of wine
besotted creatures in a manner which distinguishes the impassionate crime of
seconl degree murder from that of the comparatively deliberate, cool, nonpassionate crime of murder in the first degree." Language here employed might
suggest a confusion of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. However, consistent with the holding of the court, a killing in the heat of passion
will be second degree murder, not voluntary manslaughter where it is determined that there was an absence of adequate provocation, and intoxication
does not reduce the standard for provocation. See Pirtle v. State, 28 Tenn. 663
(1849); Norfleet v. State, 36 Tenn. 340 (1857); Lewis v. State, 202 Tenn. 328,
304 S.W.2d 322 (19.57): Bostick %. State, 210 Tenn. 620, 360 S.W.2d 472 (1962).
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requisite of the statutory offense in Tennessee. 45 Black v. State46
involved a conviction of assault with intent to commit robbery. 47
Robbery is an aggravated larceny from the person, and thus the court
reached a consideration of whether the facts proven unequivocally
demonstrated an attempted larceny, or whether, as the defendant insisted, the jury should have been charged concerning the lesser included offense of assault and battery.
The defendant and another had assaulted the victim after the
latter had parked his car and was proceeding to the YMCA where
he lived. They brutally attacked him for about five minutes until
others responded to his cries for help, whereupon the two attackers
fled. One of them grabbed the victim's toolbox, which he had been
carrying when attacked, but as one of the rescuers chased him, he
dropped it in the street a short distance from the point of the attack, and it was recovered. The court correctly concluded that there
was a sufficient asportation of the toolbox for larceny. 48 The most
49
noteworthy decision on asportation in Tennessee is Caruso v. State,
where the defendant had attempted to steal a 600-pound safe. The
evidence showed that the defendant had managed to move it five
feet. It was still in the building and apparently had not been opened.
The court held that the requirements of larceny had been satisfied. 50
While there can be little question that the facts in the present
case are sufficient to Sutpport a finding of asportation, it may be suggested, as Judge Galbreath in dissent argued, that the court decided
this aspect of the case on a specious issue. Indeed, for a conviction
of assault with intent to commit robbery, it is not necessary that an

45. Larceny is defined as "the felonious taking and carrying away the personal
goods of another." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4202 (1955). "Carrying away" has
been construed as synonymous with "asportation." Caruso v. State, 205 Tenn.
211, 326 S.W.2d 434 (1958).
46. 443 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-607 (Supp. 1969).

48. "It is immaterial that these assailants retained possession of it and its contents
for only a brief period of time and then abandoned it in the street. The
slightest movement of the property by another by trespass is sufficient to satisfy
the law's requirement of asportation, carrying away." 443 S.W.2d at 526.
49. 205 Tenn. 211, 326 S.W.2d 434 (1958).
50. The court quotes Gettinger v. State, 13 Neb. 308, 14 N.W. 403, 404 (1882), for
the point that "[e]ven if the removal were but a hair's breadth, it will do."
See generally 2 NVHARrON § 480. It is essential, however, that for at least a
moment in time it can be said that the property was within the control of
the defendant. Thus, in the oft-cited case. People v. Myer, 75 Cal. 383, 17 P.
431 (1888), the defendant jerked an overcoat from a store dummy and attempted to abscond with it, only to discover that it was fastened to the dummy
by a chain. The court concluded that the defendant could not be convicted
of larceny of the coat.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
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asportation be proven. 5 1 The dissenting opinion provided additional
facts surrounding the altercation, to wit, the victim had swung his
tool box at his attackers in an attempt to defend himself, whereupon
one ot the assailants grabbed his arm and the box was torn from his
grasp. This then raised an issue not of asportation but of intent to
steal.52
To appreciate this question, a Maine decision, State v. Boisvert,5 3
involving less anbiguous facts, is worthy of comparison. There the
defendant was charged with robbery in the taking of a revolver, but
he submitted that the revolver was taken from the assailant in the
lawful act of self-defense. The court held that if the defendant were
correct in this allegation, then he did not have the requisite intent
to steal at the time of the taking to sustain a finding of larceny.54
While the defendant in the Black case could not claim self-defense,
he still could contend that there was no clear indication of an intent to steal in the conduct described here. The dissent concluded,
-[l]t may have been that the unprovoked attack had as its basis
simply a warped desire to inflict great bodily harm on the prosecuting witness. - - The issue was not which interpretation of the fact
was more credible but simply whether the evidence could support the
conviction for the lesser included offense and thus warrant a jury
charge to that effect.5 6
2. Shoplifting. Binkley v. State -.7 would appear to be the first
appellate decision to require an interpretation of the Tennessee shoplifing statute. ;, The defendant was convicted of attempt to commit
grand larceny.- ' He and two others were employees in a furniture
warehouse. They had been working on an automobile that they had
51. "An actual and personal assault must be made upon the party, coupled with
a felonious intent, in order to complete the offences." State v. Freels, 22 Tenn.
227, 229 (1842). (The court is here discussing an earlier decision involving
assault with intent to murder but is implicitly saying that the explanation is
equally appropriate to the present offense.)
52. "'The taking must be . . . with the intent to deprive the owner, not temporarily, but permanently, of his property." Fields v. State, 46 Tenn. 524, 526
(1869).
53. 236 A.2d 419 (Me. 1967).
54. See also People v. Brosnan, 31 App. Div. 2d 975, 299 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1969); see
generally 2 WHARTON §§ 452, 453.
55. 443 S.W.2d at 527.

56. The argument of the dissent cuts both ways: if theft was not the motive of
the assault, the alternative interpretation suggests a potential charge of assault
with intent to commit murder. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-604

57. 434 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4235 (Supp. 1969).
811 (1963).
59. TENN.

CODi

ANN. § 39-603

(1965).

(1955).

See generally Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d
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driven inside the warehouse. As they began to drive the car out, a
supervisor opened the trunk and discovered several items of property
belonging to the furniture company. It was the contention of the defendant that he was at most chargeable with shoplifting, a misdemeanor.
The pertinent language in the shoplifting statute read, "goods,
wares or merchandise offered for sale by any store or other mercantile establishment." 60 Any act that would fall within the statute would
also come within the definition of larceny. 61 However, where a general
and a specific statute deals with the same subject matter, the more
specific statute will control, particularly where the result, as in this
case, subjects a criminal defendant to a less harsh punishment.6 2 The
issue then was whether the acts of the defendant were encompassed
by the shoplifting statute. 63 The court held that the warehouse was
not a retail outlet but rather a supply house to the retail stores of
the company, and therefore did not come within the contemplation
of the statute.
A common sense reading of the statute clearly supports the conclusion of the court. A Kansas case 64 involving similar facts assumed
without deciding that the defendant who took a television set from
a warehouse could have been convicted of shoplifting. The court held
that this fact did not preclude atconviction for grand larceny. A
Connecticut decision,6
( ; however, put forth a very narrow delineation
of shoplifting and thereby lends support to the present case. There
the defendant was charged with stealing goods from a trading stamp
redemption store. The court held that the items taken did not constitute, in the language of the statute, "goods, wares or merchandise
offered or exposed for sale." 66
60. Subsequent to the commission of the crime here involved, the shoplifting statute
was amended to limit its application to takings not in excess of $100. This
change would preclude its application in cases such as the present one.
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4202 (1955).
62. See generally 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSIRUCTION § 5204 (3d ed. Horack
1943). And see discussion of this same issue in regard to the Tennessee robbery
statutes in Cook, Criminal Laze in Tennessee in 1968-A Critical Survey, 36
TENN. Iw
RE'. 221. 230-31 (1969) [hereinafter cited 1968 Survey]. But see

Black v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 631. 393 P.2d 190 (1964); State v. Crowe, 196 Kan.
622, 414 P.2d 50

(1966); 2

VHARION §§ 174-75.

63. The problem of shoplifting, from the perspective of the shopkeeper, is discussed
in Mayfield, Shoplifting in

Tennessee, 24 TENN. L. REV. 1177

(1957).

See also,

Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 435 (1962).
64. State v. Crowe,

196 Kan. 622, 414 P.2d 50 (1966).

65. State v. Benson, 153 Conn. 209, 214 A.2d 903 (1965).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-63(b) (Supp. 1969). "Where the consideration or
medium of exchange normally contemplated and utilized in the sale of goods
consists of trading stamp books, rather than cash or credit, those goods would
not fall within the commonly approved usage of the quoted language." 153
Conn. at 214-15, 214 A.2d at 907.
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3. Credit Card Crime. A new species of offenses was legislatively
created under the aegis of the State Credit Card Crime Act. 67 The
Act seeks to specifically cover offenses involving the use of credit cards
68
that might be difficult to pigeon-hole in traditional theft offenses.
Among the offenses covered by the Act are certain false statements in
writing made for the purpose of procuring a credit card, the unauthorized use of the credit card of another, the sale of a credit card by
a person other than the issuer, the purchase of a credit card from a
person other than the issuer, the obtaining of a credit card as a security
for a debt with the intent to defraud the issuer, the acceptance of
the credit cards of two or more persons within a twelve month period
known to have been taken or retained in violation of the act, the
false making or embossing of a credit card, the use of a forged, expired or revoked credit card, and the false representation by a merchant
to the issuer of a credit card that he has furnished something of
value to a card holder with the intent to defraud.
A previously existing statute(',! concerned with credit card offenses
to a more limited extent was not repealed. This section is in one respect broader in that it includes the use of any "other credit device"
in addition to a credit card. More importantly, the new Act requires,
'n the case of a revoked card, that the defendant "knows" it to be
revoked. The prior statute provides that notice of revocation "shall
be conclusively presumed to have been given when deposited, as registered or certified matter, in the United States mail, addressed to such
person at his address as it appears in the files of the issuer of the
credit card" (emphasis supplied). In cases where particular conduct
would be subject to prosecution under either Act, the new Act is con7
trolling. 0
4. Receiving Stolen Property. The offenses of receiving and concealing stolen property produced analytical problems which became
extraordinarily intricate in Tackelt v. State]5 For a conviction of re-

67.

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1968 (Supp. 1969).
PENAL CODE §§ 484d-484g (West 1968).

68. See PERKINS at 318-19.
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1948

70. Id. at § 39-1978.
comes

within

For comparable legislation see CAL.

(Supp. 1969).

A recent decision has correctly held that where an offense

the designation

of

credit

card

offense

per TENN.

CODE

ANN.

§ 39-1948 (Supp. 1969), it is improper to charge the defendant with a more
general and more severe criminal offense, in this instance receiving and concealing stolen property, Id. at § 39-4218; Hall v.State, 4 CRIM. L. REP. 2404
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). See discussion accompanying note 62 supra. Cf.
People v. Liberto, 79 Cal. Rptr. 306 (App. 1969), involving a statutory provision to the contrary. See also McDuffy v. State, 6 Md. App. 537, 252 A.2d
270 (1969).
71. 443 S.W.2d 450 (Tenn. 1969).
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ceiving or concealing stolen property the prosecution must show (1)
knowledge that the property was stolen, and (2) intent to deprive
the owner thereof.%' However, a significant distinction is drawn between the offenses of receiving and concealing stolen property. 73 A
person who was himself the thief cannot be guilty of receiving stolen
property, as he cannot receive property from himself; he can, how4
ever, be charged with concealing stolen property.'
In the Tackett case, the defendant was charged with second degree burglary, grand larceny, and receiving and concealing stolen
property. The evidence showed that a residence had been forcibly
entered during the daytime and a number of items were stolen, including an electric typewriter, a portable radio and a camera. On
the clay of the theft, but prior to any report thereof, a policeman observed the portable radio and the camera in the possession of a party
in a beer tavern. Upon inquiry, the policeman was told that the
items had been purchased from defendant. Later the same day the
electric typewriter was recovered from another party who told the
police the defendant had given it to him as security for a $30 loan.
The defendant first told the officers that he had received the items
from persons unknown 'to him. At the trial, he denied having sold
the portable radio and camera at all and claimed to have been too
intoxicated to remember anything about the electric typewriter. The
jury found the defendant not guilty of burglary and grand larceny
but guilty of receiving and concealing stolen property.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that
there was no evidence to support the finding that the defendant had
received or concealed the property knowing it to be stolen. The
court did, however, believe that the defendant could have been found
guilty of larceny, because of the inference which may be drawn from
the unexplained possession of recently stolen prop)erty. 7 5 Thus, it concluded, since the defendant could have been charged with the theft,
he could not be charged with receiving stolen property. The case
72. Reiterated in Bennett %. State, "t35 S.W.2d 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968). See
also Lewis v. State, 50 Tenn. 214 (1871); Parham v. State, 78 Tenn. 498 (1882);
State v. Missio. 105 Tenn. 218, 58 S.V. 216 (1900): Williams v. State, 216 Tenn.
89, 390 S.W.2d 234 (1965); Kessler v. State, 220 Tenn. 82, 414 S.V.2d 115 (1967);
Deerfield v. State, 220 Tenn. 546, 420 S.V.2d 649 (1967).
73. The statutory language was modified in 1968 in an effort to more clearly
delineate two separate offenses. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4217, 39-4218
(Snpp. 1969).
74. See Deerfield %. State, 220 'Fenn. 546, 420 S.W.2d 649 (1967), discussed in
1968 Survey at 227-28.
75. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 27 Tenn. 75 (1847); Curtis v. State, 46 Tenn. 9 (1868);
McGuire v. State. 65 Tenn. 621 (1872); Cook v. State. 84 Tenn. 461 (1886).
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was thereupon ordered remanded for trial on the simple charge of
concealing stolen property. A dissenting judge contended that the
judgment should be reversed and the case dismissed on the authority
of Kessler v. State,76 as there was no direct evidence that the property
had been stolen.
The supreme court found neither analysis to be correct and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. While it is true that the unexplained possession of recently stolen property may raise an inference of larceny, it may also raise an inference of the receipt of stolen
property. 7 7 Since there was some evidence that the defendant had
received the stolen property-that is, the testimony of the officer regarding the admission of the defendant-the court of criminal appeals was incorrect in concluding that the crime of receiving stolen
property could not possibly have been committed. The relevance
of the Kessler decision was rejected on factual distinctions. There
the defendant had sold stolen narcotics to a narcotics agent, but the
court concluded that there was no evidence indicating that the defendant had known the property to be stolen. The court declined to
entertain the inference of guilty knowledge from possession. In the
present case, however, the "character of possession clearly warrants
the inference, in the absence of a reasonable and honest explanation,
that Tackett received the property with guilty knowledge of its theft. ' 78
In Kessler, the defendant was a narcotics pusher, and the source of
his supply was, to him, immaterial. Further, the fact that the theft occurred in Nashville and the defendant took possession of the drugs
in Bowling Green, Kentucky, after negotiating a sale in Nashville was
indicative of a lack of knowledge of the theft. In the present case,
the possession by the defendant was far more temporally and spatially
confined in proximity to the theft. Furthermore, the activities of the
defendant were more suggestive of one in possession of property known
to be stolen than were those in Kessler, where the conduct of the de-

76. 220 Tenn. 82, 414 SAV.2d 115 (1967).
77. "[T]he unexplained possession of goods quite recently stolen may warrant the
inference they were illegally received and so impose on the accused the obligation of accounting for their possession in a straightforward, truthful way,
in the absence of which a jury would he warranted in returning a verdict of
guilty." 443 S.W.2d at 451. See also Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d 681
(6th Cir. 1951).
Implicitly, the court is holding that for this inference to apply, it is unnecessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant was not himself the
thief. See People v. Marquez. 237 Cal. App. 2d 627, 47 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1965);
Stanley v. State, 97 Ga. App. 828, 104 S.E.2d 591 (1958). Cf. Liakas v. State,
199 Tenn. 549, 288 S.W.2d 430 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 845 (1956).
78. 443 S.W.2d at 452.

1970]

CRIMINAL LAW IN

TENNESSEE

fendant would be essentially the same, whether the narcotics were
stolen or had been obtained from other legal or illegal sources.
C. Against Person and Property
1. Arson. While the unexplained possession of recently stolen
property may raise an inference of theft or of receiving or concealing
9
such an inference canstolen property on the part of the possessor, 7:
according to Collins
commission
of
arson,
not be drawn to prove the
v. State.8" There a vacant house was unexplainedly burned down.
Afterwards, in checking the ruins it was noted that there was no
debris of certain items that would not have been totally destroyed
in the fire, notably an organ. A short time later, the defendant was
found in possession of a number of items that were in the house,
the organ among them. He was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation of how he came into possession of the property. The only
other evidence implicating the defendant was a report that a car
similar to his had been observed going toward the house shortly before the fire was discovered.
The crime of arson t requires proof of willfulness and malice. Earlier
cases have held that even a confession by the accused is not enough,
in and of itself, to establish the corpus delicti of the offense. 82 The
court in the present case felt that the cumulative evidence fell far
short of even this. Even if it be assumied that a case of theft could
be ntmde out against the defendant based on the legal presumption
arising Iront the unexplained possession of stolen property, it was impossible to infer from this a willful and malicious burning, since too
many other hypotheses were readily conceivable. If the defendant had
accidentally set fire to the building in perpetrating the theft, the eleinents of arson would not be proven. The cotrt offered a number
of other possibilities. ": Thus it concluded the evidence was madequate to sustain the conviction.

79. See text accompansoing notes 71-78 supra.
80. 445 S.\\.2d 931 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
81.
NN. CODE Ax. § 39-501 (Supp. 1969).
82. Copley v. State, 153 Tenn. 189, 281 S.V. 460 (1925); Rickets v. State, 192 Tenn.
649, 241 S.W.2d 604 (1950).
Ihe house could have burned from spontaneous combustion. A careless match
83.
or cigarette from anyone, including one of the three unidentified men seen
driving towards the house in the unidentified car, could have started the blaze.
The action of some animal such as a rat or squirrel gnawing on a match on a
kitchen shelf; the accumulation of oily rags in an attic, or any, number of
inexhaustible hypothesis [sic] could be advanced to possibly account for the
fire which left no evidence of an incendiary, or criminal origin." 445 S.W.2d
at 933.
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D. Public Offenses
1. Vagrancy. Vagrancy statutes have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, 84 and a number of statutes have been held unconstitutional in whole or in part. 85 The Tennessee statute 86 came under
attack in Kirkwood v. Ellington,8 7 a class action challenging the
constitutionality of the act and seeking an injunction against a prosecution under it. The plaintiffs contended that the statute was being
employed discriminately against Negroes. Testimony of public officials
indicated a growing concern with the problem of solicitation for prostitution in an area of several blocks in Memphis. Because the suspects were able to identify the officers, arrests for prostitution became
virtually impossible. Thus it became a regular practice of officers
to detain women frequently seen in the area and question them respective to their employment. They would then be warned of their
vulnerability to arrest for vagrancy if they were seen in the area again.
Each officer kept a record of these encounters. If the individual were
subsequently observed in the area, she would be arrested for vagrancy
and specifically charged under the statutory language declaring it a
misdemeanor "for any person having no apparent means of subsistence
to neglect to apply himself to some honest calling."
The court held that this language was unconstitutionally vague, 88
noting that there was a wide range of views among the arresting officers themselves as to what the phrases "apparent means of subsistence" and "honest calling" meant.80, Additionally, it found that the

84. See generally Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66
HARV. L. RiEV. 1203 (1953); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956); Comment, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102 (1962); Davis,
Vagrancy-Loitering Laws: An Antithesis to Recent Jurisprudential Trends, 35
TENN. LAW REV. 617 (1968).
85. See, e.g., Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967);
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S2d 729, 229 N.E.2d 426 (1967); City of
Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967); Ricks v. District of Columbia,
414 F.2d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Broughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260 (N.D.
Ala. 1969); Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969); Goldman
v. Knecht, 295 F. Stipp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969); Knowlton v. State, 257 A.2d 409
(Me. 1969).
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4701

(1955).

87. 298 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Tenn. 1969).
88. The court quoted Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); and Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). See also Knowlton v. State, 257 A.2d 409 (Me.
1969).
89. "A penal law which creates such a diversity of opinion on the part of those
charged with its enforcement is unconstitutional." 298 F. Supp. at 466. This
statement was not needed to justify the conclusion of the court and, it is
submitted, is of dubiotiF relevance. Certainly a statute can be constitutionally
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language was overbroad and thereby infringed upon the constitutional
rights of innocent parties. 90 To the extent that the Kirkwood decision is followed by state courts, the notorious Tennessee decision
Fonle v. State,9t where the conviction for vagrancy of a gambler with
over seven hundred dollars in cash in his possession at the time of his
arrest was affirmed because the money had not been gained in an
"honest calling," 92 has become moot. The vagrancy statute describes
three other patterns of behavior that are prohibited: (1) loitering
about gambling houses; (2) loitering about houses of ill fame; and
(3) "strolling through the country without any visible means of support." It was not necessary in the present case for the court to consider
the validity of a conviction under any of these provisions.
2. New Offenses. Several statutory additions and modifications
were enacted regarding various public offenses. The statutory offense
proscribing obscene remarks over the telephone was amended to cover
in addition the making of anonymous calls and repeated calls for the
pur)pose of harassment. 93 The more general obscenity statute was
amended to provide for the issuance of a temporary injunction against
the removal of obscene materials from the jurisdiction of the court,
increase the maximum fine for the offense from one thousand to five
thousand dollars, and stipulate a broad definition of the term "person"
94
as used in the statute to include any type of organization of people.

90.

91.
92.
93.

valid notwithstanding its non-comprehension by one or many enforcing officers.
If the point is that a valid arrest cannot be made unless the arresting officer
understands the elements of the offense, this too would seem not to be correct.
The question is whether objectively there was probable cause to believe an
offense was committed. See text accompanying notes 225-32 infra.
"The fact that the motive or purpose of the vagrancy statute is to prevent
another and separate crime of prostitution does not justify the possible inclusion
of those persons not on the street for criminal purposes." 298 F. Supp. at 466.
(The plaintiff denied any involvement in prostitution or solicitation.)
213 Tenn. 204, 373 S.W.2d 445 (1963).
See also Hutchins v. State, 172 Tenn. 108, 110 S.W.2d 319 (1937).
FENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3002 (Supp. 1969). While section headings are not a
matter of constitutional impact, as are titles, See TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 17,
It may be
they are relevant in matters of statutory interpretation.
noted that the heading of the present section, Telephone conversations-Lewd,
obscene and lascivious remarks-Penalty, which was not altered by the amendment, no longer fully encompasses the text of the section. See generally 2
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4903 (3d ed. Horack 1943) [hereinafter
cited as SUTHERLAND].

A recent yet-unreported decision held that calling a listener a "lice carrying
son of a bitch" did not constitute an obscene telephone conversation under
the statute. Lowrie v. State, 4 CRIM. L. REP. 2533 (Tenn. Crim. App., March 5,
1969).
94. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3003

(Supp. 1969).
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Finally, a new series of statutes was enacted prohibiting the sale or
loan of specified pornographic materials to minors. 95
A wholly new act for the provision of "campus control" prohibits
interference with the normal activities of campus facilities, 9 6 obstructing ingress or egress to campus facilities,' 7 and entering a campus for
the purpose of inciting violence.1 s
Finally, a new offense was created making it a misdemeanor for
any person to teach a course in sex education in any public, elementary, junior high, or high school unless approved by the state
board of education and the local school board involved. Excepted are
high school courses in biology, physiology, health, physical education
9
and home economics.
111 . DEFENSES
A.

Insanity

Among the defenses proffered in Simpson v. State' 0 o was mental
incapacity. The defendant requested and was denied the following
jury instruction:
I further charge you that if you find from all the proof that
the defendant did not know what he was doing at the time of
the alleged killing, he is not guilty in that event of any crime,
for the law requires in order to convict of any crime that the defendant was in possession of his faculties. 10'
95. Id. at §§ 39-1012-1016. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the
propriety of more restrictive obscenity standards in regard to exposure to

minors in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1215 (Supp. 1969). Each of these provisions is applicable
to publicschools as well as institutions of higher education.
97. Id. at § 39-1216.
98. Id. at § 39-1217. Again there is an error in the section heading, in this instance
attributable to the codifiers, and an error that could give rise to a problem
of interpretation. The text of the statute refers to "a public disturbance
involving an act or acts of violence" (emphasis added). The section heading
reads "to incite public disturbance or violence" (emphasis added). Thus the
section heading suggests a possibility of a violation where a campus was
entered to incite a public disturbance not involving violence. Where such a
conflict exists between the language of the text of the statute and the section
heading, the normal rule of construction is to the effect that the section
heading will not be used to broaden the scope of application of the statute.
See 2 SUTHERLAND § 4903.
99. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1924 (Supp. 1969). The stipulated exceptions are so
broad as to render the statute virtually impotent. The statute is only applicable
to "courses in sex education," as opposed to "instruction," and as long as the
course carries the designation of one of the excepted subjects there would
appear little langer of a violation. For a discussion of this statute, see Note,
37 TENN. L. REV. 654 (1970).
100. 437 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
Also discussed is malice aforethought, text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
101. Id. at 540.
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The court of criminal appeals interpreted this as raising a defense of
amnesia and then proceeded to reject it.12
It is dubious that this
instruction actually describes the condition of amnesia, which connotes a loss of memory, 03 not a loss of awareness. In fairness to the
court, it is impossible to determine what the defendant is suggesting
by this instruction. The defendant testified that he had "a memory
lapse or blackout" at the time of the offense, and a doctor testified
that the defendant had apparently had an epileptic seizure at an
earlier hearing and was at that time "disoriented."
Tennessee has consistently adhered to the M'Naghten test 04 in the
determination of insanity, and the courts have not been concerned with
the particular malady claimed by the defendant except as it bears on
satisfying the test.' 05- The instruction requested in the present case
would appear to be an extremely inarticulate paraphasing of the first
part of the M'Naghten test and was justifiably refused.
B. Self-Defense
In McClain v. State'
the defendant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter in the death of her husband. The father of the deceased, who observed the couple about an hour prior to the death,
testified that he saw the defendant assault the victim several times,
once with a butcher knife and once with a small radio. During this
time, the deceased was attempting to gather up his clothes with the
intent of leaving. Each time he placed them on a chair, the defendant
threw them to the floor. The defendant, who was the only witness
to the death, testified that the deceased had been beating her, she
06

102. "[A]mnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge unless it is shown
by competent evidence that the accused 'did not know the nature and quality
of his act and that it was wrong.'" Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 653, 301
S.W.2d 358, 361 (1957); Lester v. State, 212 Tenn. 338, 347, 370 S.W.2d 405,
409 (1963). Both decisions are quoted in the principal case.
103. See "Amnesia" I ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 807 (1968).
104. "[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong." Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng.
Rep. 200, 210 (1843).
105. See, e.g., cases cited, note 102 supra, re amnesia. Alleged irresistible impulses have
likewise been of no particular significance. See Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106,
28 S.W. 312 (1894); Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S.W. 168 (1915);
McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S.W. 883 (1922); Temples v. State, 183
Tenn. 531, 194 S.W.2d 332 (1946); Ryall v. State, 204 Tenn. 422, 321 S.W.2d 809
(1959); Spurlock v. State, 212 Tenn. 132, 368 S.W.2d 299 (1963). Noted in 31
See generally Woolf, Criminal Responsibility and
TENN. L. REV. 251 (1964).
Insanity, 27 TENN. L. REV. 389 (1960).
106. 445 S.W.2d 942 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
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had bitten him, and he had retired to the bathroom for medication.
She said that he threatened to further mistreat her and she thereupon
took a pistol to defend herself. Then, she testified, "I came back to
a little hall and I said to him, 'Mac, you're not going to whip me anymore today' and I shut my eyes. I raised up the pistol, I shut my
eyes and pulled the trigger." 1' 7 The court held that, accepting the defendant's account of the facts, a case of self-defense was not presented.' 0 8
The decision is consistent with recent holdings. 10 9
C. Defense of Property
In Brown v. State"" the defendant appealed the refusal of the following requested instruction:
If you find that Mike Westfield was in the actual perpetration
of a felony, that is that of larceny, when he was shot, then you
should acquit the defendant."'I
The couit- was of the opinion that the jury had rejected the contention
that the victim was engaged in theft at the time of the affray, but
even assuming such to be the case, the protection of property could
not justify the taking of life.' 12 Marks v. Brown, 113 an action for
wrongful death, would appear to be the only prior Tennessee case in
which the issue has arisen. There the court held that the attempted
larceny of poultry belonging to the defendant did not render the
homicide justified.
D. Resisting Illegal Arrest
In Long v. State,1 14 a posse of eight officers went to the home
of the defendant to airest him for the misdemeanor of assault and
battery. According to the prosecution, they identified themselves and
stated their purpose, whereupon the defendant responded that he
would kill anyone who entered the house intending to arrest him.
They then forcibly entered the house and confronted the defendant
107. Id. at 944.
108. "Until he indicated that he intended to attack the defendant tinder the circumstances existing at the time of the killing, the jury could conclude that
the defendant had no reason to believe her danger was such as justified the
taking of life." Id. at 945.
109. See Nance v. State, 210 Tenn. 328, 358 S.W.2d 327 (1962), and May v. State,
220 Tenn. 541, 420 S.W.2d 647 (1967) discussed in 1968 Survey at 232-33.
110. 441 S.W.2d 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (See discussion, text accompanying
notes 16-17, 38-40, supra).
Ill. Id. at 488. Another refused instruction was premised on danger to the person
of the defendant, which apparently was completely unsupported by the evidence.
112. The court quoted at length from several treatises to substantiate the point.
See, e.g., I WHARTON § 223.
113. 60 Tenn. 87 (1873).
114. 443 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1969).
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standing at the foot of his bed with a shotgun. The defendant announced that he was going to shoot and then did; the lead officer
lurched to the floor, simultaneously firing his pistol, and the shot by
the defendant killed the second officer. After a further exchange of
gunfire the defendant surrendered. The defendant testified that his
wife awakened him to tell him someone was breaking the door down.
He then reached for his gun which was located next to the bed and
fired when someone shined a flashlight in his eyes. He contended
that he did not know whom he was firing at. While the officers had
in their possession an arrest warrant, it had not been sworn to before a magistrate and wits therefore void. It was the theory of the
defendant that since the arrest was illegal his resistance was justified.
The trial judge, however, instructing the jury on the issue of selfdefense, said that the validity of the warrant wits inconsequential."II r
The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction on the authority, according to the supreme court,''" of Poteete v. State.1 17 There
the defendant had been convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol and
a fine had been imposed. Judgntent executions were given to the
deceased deputy sheriff which ordered the defendant to be taken into
custody until the amount of the judgment was paid. The process was
apparently void because it was issued by the court clerk without any
order Or judgment of the court, and in fact the court found that, as
the defendant had posted sureties for the fine, his arrest was unauthorized in any event. As the charge against the defendant was a misdemeanor, not committed in the presence of the officer, the validity
of the court order was essential to the legality of the arrest.'' 8 The
court concluded that the officer lacked authority for the arrest and
thus acted at his peril,'1 : and the defendant was not chargeable with
murder. Regrettably, the court did not discuss the facts surrounding
the death of the officer.
The supreme couIt, while agreeing that the case must be renanded
115. "You

116.
117.
118.

119.

have heard some testimony concerning a charge of assault and battery
set out in a paper writing, designated a State's warrant. You will not consider
whether it was technically valid or invalid. You may consider such testimony
as explanation of the presence of the deceased and other officers at the scene
if it does so explain that." Id. at 478.
The opinion of the court of criminal appeals is unpublished.
68 Tenn. 261 (1878).
The defendant in the principal case was also being arrested for a misdemeanor.
"While we go far toward justifying an officer in the hona fide performance of
his official duty, in obedience to an apparent warrant issued by a proper officer,
and would hold that no mere technical or formal objection should be allowed
to prevent his being shielded from the charge of an unauthorized aggression,
yet, on the other hand, we must remember, that the rights and liberties of a
citizen can only be invaded by due process of law." 68 Tenn. at 265.
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for a new trial, was concerned that the court of criminal appeals
had left the impression that "any slaying of a peace officer with a
' 20
void warrant may be justified, and is never more than manslaughter."'
Two decisions were cited by the court. Galvin v. Statel 2 l involved
anl attempted warrantless arrest for assault following a complaint by
the party assaulted. Considering whether the killing should be reduced from murder to manslaughter the court said:
An unlawful arrest, made bona fide under color of legal authority, is a trespass, and like other trespasses, it may, or may
not, in particular case, constitute an aggravated provocation.
And the mere fact that the officer or citizen attempting the
arrest, and being -slain in so doing, has exceeded his authority,
does not necessarily reduce the killing to manslaughter, if the
slayer had no reason to believe himself in imminent danger of
life, or great bodily harm, and the homicide were, in fact, perpetrated, not in passion or sudden heat, upon the provocation of
22
the arrest, but with cool, deliberate malice and premeditation.
In Hurd v. Str "- ' the officer was attempting to make a warrantless
arrest for the misdemeanor of unlawfully carrying a pistol following
a bar room fracas. Again the court recognized that there was no
privilege to use unlimited force in resisting an illegal arrest.
The amount of force which he may use in self-defense, however,
is that only which is necessary to prevent the carrying out of
the unlawful purpose. If excessive force is used in making resistance, the right of self-defense is eliminated, and killing by
means calculated to cause death, with knowledge that the in24
tent was only to arrest, is murder.'
With these guiding principles, the principal case was remanded for
a new trial.
While the court was only concerned with the instruction by the
trial court that repudiated an), significance to the invalidity of the
warrant and thus the case was disposed of on this issue, other considerations may be worthy of note. If the testimony of the defendant
to the effect that he had no knowledge of the identity of the intruders
is believed, then there is authority in the Hurd decision that this fact
may be determinative in reducing the offense to manslaughter.' 25
Indeed, if the defendant in good faith had no way of knowing that
at 478.
46 Tenn. 283 (1869).
Id. at 292.
119 Tenn. 583, 108 S.W. 1064 (1907).
Id. at 595, 108 S.W. at 1067-68. The court is here quoting from the Annotation
in 66 L.R.A. 353, 387 (1905).
125. 119 Tenn. at 594-95, 596, 108 S.W. at 1067, 1068.
120. 443 S.W.2d

121.
122.
123.
124.
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the invaders were not burglars then he might legitimately raise the
defense of justifiable homicide, and in this case it would seem the
validity of the warrant would be inconsequential.' 26 Even if it were
determined that the warrant for arrest were valid, the manner of
execution might still be unreasonable, thus illegal, in the fourth amendment sense.'1 7 From the facts given, it is curious that there was a
need to execute the warrant for a past misdemeanor in the middle
of the night and that a posse of eight officers was needed to accomplish
the task.
IV.

A.

PARTIES

Accessories

"-

Maxwell v. State "' involved the conviction of three defendants
for robbery. Two victims, Smith and Phillips, were assaulted by the
defendants after leaving a cafe. Phillips was hit in the mouth by defendant Newmon who took his billfold and money. Defendants Maxwell and Stokes struck Smith from behind, rendering him unconscious,
and took his billfold. Each of the defendants was convicted on two
counts of robbery. It was contended on appeal that Newmon could
not be convicted of the robbery of Smith, and that Maxwell and Stokes
Could not be convicted of the robbery of Phillips, as in each instance
the parties named did not personally participate in the crime. The
Court affirmed all convictions, holding that "[a]ll who are present at
the commission of a robbery, rendering it countenance and encouragement, ready to assist should the necessity arise, are liable as principal
actors."1l29)

Typically, the aiding and abetting issue arises where there is but
126. See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 212 Tern. 633, 371 S.W.2d 633 (1963), wherein the
court quoted I WHIARTON at § 489: "In the case of a forcible attack on the

habitation, the law does not require that the danger should be real-that is,
that the peril should actually exist-to entitle a householder to resist to the
taking of life. The defendant may act on a reasonable apprehension of danger
induced by appearances. . . . On the other hand, the law does require that
the appearance should be such as would excite a reasonable apprehension of
the danger or peril in order to render the killing excusable."
127. See Ker v. California, 374 t.S. 23 (1962), holding unannounced entry reasonable under the circumstances of the case but recognizing the constitutional
issue. The justification of the conduct of the officers in the principal case may
turn on compliance with TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-806 (Supp. 1969) and § 40-807
(1955). The factual conflicts must be resolved by the jury.
128. 441 S.W.2d :03 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).

129. Id. at 504. "To be criminally responsible, the accused need not have taken
any money from the victim with his own hands, or actually participated in any
other act of force or violence; it is sufficient if he was present, aiding and
abetting, or ready and willing to aid if necessary."

§ 39-109 (1955).

Id.

See TENN.

CODE ANN.
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a single crime committed, but more than one party is involved in some
degree in its accomplishment. Thus in Woody v. State,l30 the defendant was one of two persons engaged in the burglary of a house
at the time a fatal shot was fired. The evidence was not conclusive
that the defendant fired the shot, but as the defendant and the other
burglar were engaged in a common evil design, the court held in
effect that establishing the fact that one of them fired the shot was
sufficient.
A passenger in an automobile has been recognized as an aider
and abbetor to murder committed by the driver in two cases. In
Flippen v. State,l"' the driver of the vehicle struck another vehicle
front the rear, whereupon an occupant of the hit car was thrown into
a lake and drowned. As the driver and passenger failed to stop at
the scene of the accident, the court held them both accountable for
murder.Il '' In Stallard v. State,133 the three defendants were involved
in a drag race on a public highway, two as drivers and a third as a
passenger who had served as "starter" for the race. The vehicle improperly in the left lane collided with an oncoming vehicle killing a
passenger. The court held all three defendants guilty of second degree murder.
The Tennessee decision closest in point to the principal case would
appear to be Turner v. State,13 4 where three defendants were convicted for the rape of two victims. Defendants X and Y were found
to have raped A; defendant Z raped B. The conviction, however, had
been for the rape of A only. The court held that Z was equally culpable
for the offense. l 3 5 The Maxwell case can only be factually distinguished on the basis that the defendants assaulted their respective
victims independently, while in Turner the defendants were working
collusively in regard to both victims. However, there is no question
that Maxwell involves a single nefarious venture on the part of the
three defendants and that the acts perpetrated by each reflects more

130. 46 Tenn. 299 (1869).
131. 211 Tenn. 507, 365 S.V.2d 895 (1963).
also Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 325 S.V.2d 815 (1959), affirming a
conviction of involuntary manslaughter of the driver and passenger of an
automobile, both of whom were intoxicated.
133. 209 Tenn. 13, 348 S.W.2d 489 (1961).
134. 187 Tenn. 309, 213 S.W.2d 281 (1947).
135. "From the time that Turner pointed his pistol at Miss 'A' and her companions and forced them down the north side of Capitol Hill until two hours
or more later when the girls were released and went home, all three of the
defendants played active criminal roles in the joint concerted criminal enterprise and were eCqually guilty as principals of the crimes committed." Id. at 316,
213 S.W.2d at 284.
132. See
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a division of labor than the accomplishment of two independent
crimes.
B. Victim or Accomplice
A party cannot be convicted of a felony on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.ia6 This is a particularly compelling doctrine in regard to crime against nature137 where the opportunity for
extortion is great.' 3 8 For this reason Tennessee courts have been reluctant to affirm convictions for crime against nature where the only
evidence is the testimony of the other participant in the act, even
where the party is a minor, recognized to be legally incapable of giving consent. Thus in 1959 in Sherrill v. State 31 1 the defendant was
charged with crime against nature perpetrated against two boys, ten
and eleven years old. The court held that when the conviction restilted from ."the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice even
though a child . . . the Court as a matter of law should declare a
mistrial."'' 4
In so holding, Tennessee places itself in an extremely
small minority.' 41 Interestingly, in a related context, the statute pro4 hibiting carnal knowledge of a female between twelve and twenty-one
ex)ressly requires corroboration of the testinony of the fentale. The
carnal knowledge of a female under twelve years,'4a1 as the crime against
14 4
natuire statute, says nothing of corroboriton.

The recent decision of Davis v. State' 45 indicated that if the prose-

cution could show evidence of non-consent, then the party would be
treatedt as a victim rather than accomplice. There the defendant attempted to induce a fourteen-year-old boy to engage in an unnatural
136. See Fair v. State, 2 Tenn. Cas. 481 (Shannon 1877); Hall v. State, 71 Tenn. 552
(1879); Robinson v. State, 84 Tenn. 146 (1885); Clapp v. State, 94 Tenn. 186,
r
30 S. . 214 (1895).
137. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955).
138. See Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
139. 204 Tenn. 427, 321 S.W.2d 811 (1959).
140. Id. at 436-37, 321 S.A.2d at 816. See also Boulton v. State, 214 Tenn. 94, 377
S.\V.2d 936 (1964), involving a sexual assault on a fourteen-year old boy.
141. -[A] minor under twelve years of age cannot consent, so that his submission
without resistance does not . . . render him an accomplice." 2 UNDERHILL'S
(:RIMINAi. EvnONCF 1637 (5th ed. Herrick 1957). The Sherrill case is the only
contra decision cited. "A minor who is under the age of consent, or is too
voting to understand the nature of the act, and is consequently too young to
be criminally accountable therefor, is not deemed an accomplice witness in a
prosecution for a sexual crime in which such child was involved." 2 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EViDENCE § 460 (12th ed. Anderson 1955). One contra decision is
cited, State v. Howard. 97 Ariz. 339, 401 P.2d 332 (1965), concerning a twelve
year ol girl who was anr accomplice to lewd and lascivious acts.
142. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (1955).
143. Id. at § 39-3705.
144. Curtis v. State, 167 Tenn. 427. 70 SAV.2d 363 (1932) (dictum).
145. 442 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. Crin. App. 1969).
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sex act by offering him some fishing gear and money. When the
offer was not immediately accepted, the defendant picked up a knife
and threatened to cut oft his ears and kill him if he refused to cooperate. Under the threat of the knife, the boy acquiesced in the dentands of the defendant. Afterwards, the boy cried and asked about
the fishing equipment. The defendant responded that he needed it,
gave the boy a dollar, and left. The court held that the boy had not
voluntarily engaged in the act, and therefore the conviction could
rest on his uncorroborated testimony. The subsequent inquiry concern ing the fishing gear did not preclude the jury from finding a
nn-consenstual act.
V.

A.

PROCEDURE

Due Process

Under the Tennessee Constitution an accused is entitled to a
4
trial in "the County in which the crime shall have been committed.'''
Proof of venue is thus recognized as a constitutional right under the
Stale constitution. 1 - 7 Further, under statute trial in the locus of crime
becomes a matter of jurisdiction. 14
The problem came up in a
unique way in .!ones v. RussCll.i 4
The petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus in a federal court claiming that no proof had been
offered at his trial that the offense had been committed in the county
in which the trial was conclucted.1'
Unfortunately, there was no
transcript of the trial available, and the notes and recordings of the
court reporter had been lost. The petitioner testified in the present
hearing to the facts of the case and contended that the offense had
occtrred in another county.i1Si He further stated that no evidence
had been introduced at the trial placing the crime in the county of
the trial. The trial judge testified that it was his "definite recollection"
that the offense took place in the county of trial, but he could not
146. TI-NN. CONSI. a . I. § 9.
147. See Harvey N. State, 213 Tenn. 608. 376 SAV.2d 497 (1964).
148. TENN. Cor ANN. § 40-104 (1955). See Harvey v. State, 213 Tern. 608, 376
S.\V.2d 497 (196-1).
However, "venue" may he changed on the application or
with the consent of the defendant. lEN.N. (:ODE ANN. § 40-2202 (1955).
149. 299 F. Supp. 970 (E.). Tenn. 1969).
1.10. The petitioner had twice exhausted his iciedies under state law through two
petitions for writ of habeas corpus, the firsi of which reached the United States
Supreme Court and was there remanded to the Supreme Court of Tennessee
for further proceedings. Jones 7. Russell, 390 U.S. 199 (1968). According to
the principal case. his second effort was frustrated by the trial court in refusing
to give any written reasons for the denial. of the writ as required by state law
[TFNN. CODE ANN . § 23-1809 (1955)], and as directed by the state supreme court.
FHe thus had not been properly accorded the protective processes of the law.
151. The crime of rape had occurred at or near an automobile at some point on a
public road.
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recall any testimony or details. Two jurors offered equally ambiguous
testimony. The arresting officer testified that the prosecutrix had said
at the trial that the offense had taken place in the county, although
he conceded that she had not shown him the locus of the crime. The
court concluded that the evidence was inadequate to show that the
crime occurred in the county of the trial, and that this failure of
proof resulted in a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. i
B.

Self-in crinmiat ion

1. Comment on Failure to Testify. Comment on the failure of
the defendant to testify at his trial is a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination protected by the fifth amendment, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.t 5 a In Kinser v. Cooper,5M
the defendant chose to testify, but his co-defendant did not. The
prosecutor conmented on this failure to testify, and the defendant
contended this was a violation of his constitutional rights. While it
is generally true that a defendant can only object to violations of his
own constitutional rights, in joint trials errors in the proceedings may
have an effect on a defendant not the immediate subject of the error.
Particularly relevant are the decisions involving the impact of a confession on a co-conspirator in a joint trial. t - Avoiding the postulation
of a uniform rule, the court turned to an analysis of the facts. It
152. While it is not generally true that a violation of state law is per se a denial
of fourteenth amendment due process, by virtue of the Tennessee constitutional
and statutory provisions here involved the judgment in question was void and
therefore was subject to collateral attack.
An unrelated problem in the nature of a due process question arose in the
yet-unreported case of Phinney v. State 6 CRIM. L. REP. 2142 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Oct. 16, 1969), where the defendant was prosecuted tinder the repealed
statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1904 (1953), in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. The statute was replaced by §§ 39-1959-39-1967 (Supp.
1969), according to which the court instructed the jury. The court held that
the defendant could not be prosecuted tinder either law, the first because of
the common law rule that, in the ahsence of a savings clause, a repeal works
as a pardon of all unprosecuted crimes thereunder, the second because of the
protection against ex post facto laws. Id. Coust. art. I. § 11. Presumably the
trial was held prior to the enactment of Id. § 39-114 in 1968 (see 1968 Survey
at 235-36), as that section apparently was not discussed by the court. However,
were this latter statute in effect at the time of the trial, the same result would
appear warranted. As § 39-1904 was repealed before § 39-114 enacted, there
was a period of time during which the defendant was not subject to the
jeopardy of either stattite. Thus, the passage of § 39-I 14 itself has an ex post
facto effect as applied to this defendant in reinstating a lapsed offense.
153. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The possible application of the
"harmless error" rule to Griffin violations was considered in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), hut fotund not applicable ttnder the facts.
154. 413 F. 2d 730 (6th Cir. 1969).
155. See text accompany notes 198-205 infra.
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was observed that the co-defendant was charged with aiding and
abetting the offense so that his conviction turned on a finding of
guilt as to the defendant. Thus if an inference of guilt was drawn
from his failure to testify, it followed that he was guilty of aiding
and abetting the defendant.1 56 A fortiori, the defendant must be
guilty. Thus, the court concluded that the defendant had been denied a fair trial by the comment on the failure of his co-defendant to
testify.
2. Failure to Comply with Statute. Among the more litigious selfincrimination problems of recent vintage has been that spawned by
the Mar(h('ttl-Grosso-Haynes holdings.' ; Essentially, the cases held
that the privilege against self-incrimination would be a valid defense
to a charge of failing to comply with a statutory mandate where to
(IO SO would incriminate the party in respect to other laws.15 8 The
doctrine was again applied by the Court in Leary v. United States, 159
involving violations of the Marijuana Tax Act.' 60
In United States v. Fine, 61 the issue was raised in regard to federal
liquor violations. The defendant was charged with (1) working in a
distillery, the outside of which did not bear a sign denoting the name
of the distiller and the nature of the business;162 (2) possession, custody
and control of an unregistered still;"," (3) failure to give bond required of distillers; 164 and (4) possession of unstamped distilled
spirits.6' The court held that, except for (1), the privilege against
self- ncrimination was a valid defense as compliance would incriminate
the defendant under state law.'! The first charge was distinguished
because the gravaiien of the offense was working in the distillery, as
opposed to posting a sign, and thus no incrimination would result
front compliance.
156. "There

was

no independent

crime

with

which

charged or of which he could have been convicted.

[co-defendant]

Chapman

was

It is not like a joint indict-

ment of two persons for a crime where either one or both may be convicted."

413 F. 2d at 732.
157. Marchetti v. United States, 390 t.S. 39

(1968);

Grosso v. United States, 390

U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 t.S. 85 (1968). See 1968 Survey
at 236.
158. Marchetti and (rosso involved gambling offenses; Haynes concerned the failure
to register a sawed-off shotgun.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

395
26
293
26
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. 6 (1969).

U.S.C. §§ 4741, 4742 (1964).
F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
U.S.C. §§ 5180 (a). 5681 (c) (1964).
§ 5179 (a).
§ 5173(b), 5222.
§ 5205.

166. TENN. CODE ANN. § .39-2507.

39-2513, 39

521

to 2525

(1955).

CRIMINAL LAW IN

TENNESSEE

The Fine decision creates a conflict in the federal courts in Tennessee on the issue raised. Previously the same issue arose in United
States v. McGee, 16 7 with different results. The McGee court found
the Marchetti rationale inapplicable to violations of the federal liquor
laws because the statutes were directed to the entire liquor industry,
not to "a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities,"' 168 a factor which had been noted in Marchetti.169 The Fine
court, to the contrary, reasoned that the manufacture of intoxicating
liquor in a dry county was "an area permeated with criminal stattites, ' 170 and persons engaged in such endeavors were inherently suspect.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
held consistently with McGee in a case involving the possession of unstamped liquor.171 These decisions are indicative of the general confusion that has surrounded the application of Marchetti.
It is to be noted that the Marchetti doctrine, not withstanding a
Pennsylvania decision to the contrary, 172 does not concern the admissibility of evidence but rather the culpability of the defendant to
prosecution at all. The cases did not hold any of the statutes under
consideration to be unconstitutional, but simply held that under the
facts the defendants were immune from prosecution. 17 3 Recognition
of this distinction was made in Di Piazza v. United States. 174 There
the defendant contended that evidence should have been excluded
because he was initially charged with gambling offenses against which
he could plead self-incrimination per Marchetti and Grosso. The
court held that no problem was presented since the warrants were
executed prior to the decisions in those cases, 175 the searches were
clearly legal at the time, and the decisions had not affected the constitutionality of the statutes. The Court, however, declined to intimate
an opinion of the validity of similar warrants executed subsequent to
the decisions.
167. 282 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). See 1968 Survey at 236.
168. Albertson v. Suhversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1955) (quoted
in Marchetti).
169. This was again emphasized in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 13 (1969).
170. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
171. Shoffeitt v. United States, 403 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1084 (1969).
172. Commonwealth v. Katz. 429 Pa. 406, 241 A.2d 809 (1968). But see State v.
Boiardo, 103 N.J. Super. 381, 247 A.2d 357 (1968), and State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J.
261, 250 A.2d 130 (1969), soundly criticizing the Katz decision.
173. For example, the defendant could not have plead the privilege in Marchetti
had all his gambling activities been legal under state law.
174. 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969).
175. The holdings were held not to apply to any case where the decision had become
final prior to their date of decision in Graham v. United States, 407 F.2d 1313
(6th Cir. 1969).
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3. Civil Interrogatories. United States v. Detroit Vita-l Foods,
Inc., 1 76 raised the issue of incrimination resulting from the defendants'
responses to civil interrogatories. The defendants were being simultaneously investigated by the federal government in respect to both
civil and criminal liability arising from misbranding of drugs. The
defendants were served with extensive written interrogatories in the
civil action "seeking comprehensive and detailed information about
the corporate defendant and the activities of the individual defendants
in connection with the company's business."1 77 Before the interrogatories were answered, the defendants were notified of the contemplated
criminal action, whereupon they objected to being required to respond to the interrogatories. Their request to stay the civil proceedings until the criminal action was disposed of was denied, and the
interrogatories were answered. There seemed little question that the
answers were extensively utilized by the government in preparing the
criminal prosecution. The court felt that there were but three alternatives available to the defendants: (1) refuse to answer the interrogatories, which would have resulted in a forfeiture of their property;
(2) falsely answer the interrogatories, which would make them vulnerable to a prosecution for perjury or (3) truthfully answer the interrogatories, which would incriminate them in the upcoming criminal prosectItion. The court concluded that these choices constituted a "compelling" of testimony within the contemplation of the fifth amendment.178 Equally inadmissible would be any "fruits" of the violation
of the constitutional protection.' 79 While there are no United States
Supreme Court decisions directly in point, the cases forbidding requiring a person to waive his privilege against self-incrimination or in
the alternative lose his employment'8 0 would appear to provide some
support for the present decision.
4. Prestmption of Innocence. The Tennessee bad check law'
provides that, except where the maker pays to the holder the amount
due within five days of notice, the refusal of payment by the drawee
176. 407 F.2d 570
177. Id. at 572.

(6th Cir. 1969).

178. The privilege can only be claimed by the individual, not the corporate, defendants, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911); George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968).
179. See generally Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Harrison v. United States, 392
U.S. 219 (1968).
180. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273
(1968);

Uniformed Sanitation

Men Association

392 U.S. 380 (1968).
181. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1960 (Supp. 1969).

v. Commissioner of Sanitation,
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shall "create a presumption of intent to defraud and of knowledge
of insufficient funds."' 8 2 This language was attacked in Smithson v.
State'83 as rebutting the presumption of innocence and thereby de84
nying the defendant due process of law.'
The due process test promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court requires that "there be a rational connection between the facts
proved and the fact presumed."' 8 5 This rule was recently applied by
the court in Leary v. United States.1 86 The defendant in the present
case relied on Marie v. State,1s 7 where the court had said that a legal
presumption would be unconstitutional if it deprived the defendant
of the presumption of innocence. However, the holding of the court
there was not that the presumption was unconstitutional but that it
had been effectively rebutted by the defendant. The court in the
Smithson case concluded that the rational nexus between fact and
conclusion was present, and that the defendant had not been denied
1 88
due process.
5. Handwriting Exemplars. The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment applies only to evidence of
a "testimonial or communicative nature."18 9 Thus it affords no protection against requiring an accused to execute handwriting exemplars. 190
United States v. King, 191 recognizing these principles, held that as no
constitutional right is infringed by the taking of the samples, there is
no need for a prior warning to the suspect of his fifth amendment
rights analogous to the Miranda requirements. 192 Nor is there a vio182. "The word 'notice' as used herein shall be construed to include not only
notice given to the person entitled thereto in person, but also notice given to
such person in writing. Such notice in writing shall be presumed to have been
given when deposited in the United States mail addressed to such person at
his address as it appears on such check, draft or order, or to his last known
address." Id. at § 39-1961.
183. 438 S.W.2d 61 (Tenn. 1969).
184. The defendant also contended that certain provisions in the statutory scheme
were unconstitutionally vague, but this argument was summarily rejected for
want of any specific objections.
185. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). See also United States v. Gainey,
380 U.S. 63 (1965); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
186. 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (decided subsequent to the Smithson case).
187. 204 Tenn. 197, 319 S.W.2d 86 (1958).
188. -[T]here is a natural, rational, and evidentiary relation existing between the
results of issuing this check and it coming back and showing no funds for such
a prima facie presumption to be not unfair to the accused." 438 S.W.2d at 66.
189. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). Here the privilege was held
inapplicable to a blood test to determine intoxication.
190. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
191. 415 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1969).
192. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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lation of the privilege, according to United States v. Dorem us,193
where a handwriting exemplar is taken from the defendant at his
94
trial.1
C.

Right of Confrontation

The right to confront one's accusers protected by the sixth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment."';
Two United States Supreme Court decisions are of primary relevance
in understanding current developments. In )ouglas v. Alabama1 9 a
co-conspirator was placed on the stand and the prosecutor proceeded
to read his confession, which implicated the defendant. After ever),
few sentences, the prosecutor asked the witness to affirm or deny it,
and each time the witness asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. The court concluded that this procedure had effectively deprived the defendant of the right to confront his accusers.' 97 The
rationale of Douglas was applied to a new problem in Bruton v. United
States." 8 Here the issue arose where co-conspirators were tried jointly,
and again the confession of one implicated the other, but the confessor exercised his privilege against self-incrimination and (lid not
take the stand. The court held that, nothwithstanding admonitions to
the jury not to consider the confession in determining the guilt of
the co-defendant, the latter had been denied the right of confrontation. 1 99
The only solution, if the prosecution wishes to introduce the confession in evidence, is to grant a severance to the defendants. Two
recent federal decisions hold that this may be necessary even where
the confessing defendant takes the stand if the substance of his testimony is to deny the confession. 200 Potential prejudice can likewise
not be avoided by substituting an -X" for the name of the co-de-

193. 414 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1969).
194. But this practice must also be considered in the context of the right to a fair
trial. See discussion accompanying notes 403-05,, supra.
195. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
196. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
197. "Although the Solicitor's reading of Loyd's alleged statement, and Loyd's refusal

to answer, were not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may well have
been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact made
the statement . . . [E]ffective confrontation of Loyd was possible only if Loyd
affirmed the statement as his." Id. at 419, 420.
198. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
199. Applied in United States v. DeBose, 410 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1969).
200. Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1968). West v. Henderson, 409
F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1969).
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fendant when it is patently obvious that he is the one referred to. 201
In Campbell v. United States, 2'-"2 the defendant sought protection in
Bruton from the admission in evidence of certain extra-judicial statements of co-defendants not made in his presence. The court held
Bruton inapplicable in this context as the holding had been limited
to extra-judicial statements which were inadmissible hearsay so far
as the objector was concerned. 2 113 In the present case, the statements
were admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule allowing the
admission of statements by conspirators in the furtherance of the conspiracy.
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions have placed
2
ftrther limitations on the application of Britton. In Frazier v. Cupp 04
the defendant and a co-conspirator had been indicted for the same
offense but the con-conspirator plead guilty. Before the trial, counsel
for the defendant advised the prosecutor that if the co-conspirator
were called to the stand lie would invoke the privilege against selfincrimination, and he admonished the prosecutor not to rely on the
anticipated testimony of the co-conspirator in his opening statement.
However, the prosecutor had contacted various others who were of
the opinion that the co-conspirator would in fact testify. Relying on
this information, the prosecutor included in his opening statement
a sunnI
ary of the expected testinony of the co-conspirator. No particular emphasis was given to the portion of the prosecution's case. At
one point the prosecutor referred to a paper, which could have been
understood by the jury to be a confession, although there was no explicit identification. When the co-conspirator was called to the stand,
he did invoke the privilege against all questions concerning events on
201. Greer v. State. 443 S.\V.2d 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). The point is dictum.
There is no indication in the opinion as to whether the confessor took the
stand. Cf. Maxwell v. State, 441 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969), where

the court found a confession admissible where the letters "A" and "B" were
substituted for the names of the co-defendants. Galbreath, J., dissented, contending that the rights of the co-dtefendants had not been effectively protected.
Again, there is no indication whether the confessor took the stand. Cf. Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. at 134, 1.10. However, in Davis v. State, 445 S.W.2d
933 (Tern. Crim. App. 1969) the court held the ability of the jury to identify
the co-defendant anonymously referred to was immaterial where the confessor
took the stand.
See also Hunter v. State, 440 S.V.2d I (Tenn. 1969), finding no prejudice
where cotnfessions of several of eleven defendants were introduced, but each of
the confessors took the stand arid

was subject to cross-examination.

202. 415 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1969).
203. "We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly
itnadnissible against hint under traditional rules of evidence." Bruton v. United
States. 391 U.S. at 128.
201. 394 lS. 731 (1969).
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the day of the crime. The defendant contended that the conduct of
the prosecutor amounted to reversible error under the authority of
Douglas and Bruton. The court found both cases distinguishable.
The situation in Douglas where a transcript of the confession was read
to the witness was a far cry from a brief paraphrase of a statement
made where no one was on the stand. Nor was the jury asked, as in
Bruton, "to perform the mental gymnastics of considering an incriminating statement against only one of two defendants in a joint trial." 205
Under the circumstances, the court concluded that cautionary instructions to the jury not to consider any statement made by counsel as
evidence afforded adequate protection to the defendant.
Of even more significance to all aspects of constitutional criminal
procedure was the holding in Harrington v. California.206 The defendant and three co-defendants were jointly tried, and the confessions
of the three co-defendants were introduced in evidence with instructions to the jury that each confession should be considered only
against the confessor. One of the co-defendants took the stand and
was subjected to cross-examination by counsel for the defendant; the
other two co-defendants chose not to testify. While recognizing a violation of the Bruton standard, the Court held that the lack of opportunity to cross-examine constituted harmless error because the case
2 7
against the defendant was "overwhelming." 0
The Harrington decision is noteworthy not only because of its
effect in limiting the impact of Britton, but also because it is the first
decision in which the Supreme Court has applied the harmless error
rule to an acknowledged violation of a constitutional right.2 08 The
device is potentially an effective means of diminishing the effect of
prior decisions without overruling them.
D. Arrest
1. Probable Cause. The most frequently quoted definition
,
probable cause for arrest is found in Beck v. Ohio:2U )

of

205. Id. at 735.
206. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
207. "The case against Harrington was not woven from circumstantial evidence. It
is so overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this state conviction undisturbed." Id. at
254. Followed in Nix v. State, 446 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); United
States v. Long, 415 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 327-32

infra.
208. The possibility was recognized but not utilized in Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967). See also Black, J., dissenting, in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391

U.S. 543 (1968).
209. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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[W]hether at that moment the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that 0the petitioner had committed or was committing
21
an offense.
Within this broad framework, the presence of probable cause must
be determined in each case by a careful factual analysis. United States
v. Kucinich,2'1 created the need for such an analysis. There a federal
agent was notified by a car rental service that two cars, a Ford and
a Mercury, rented in the name of John T. Demoss, had not been returned. Thereafter the agent received a call from a motel manager
informing him that two men, a woman, and a child had registered
at the motel, and one member of the party used the name John T.
Demoss. They had arrived in a car which fit the description of the
Mercury. Earlier it had been determined that the man who identified
himself as Demoss resembled one Edmondson, who was on the FBI's
ten most wanted list. 2 12 Three agents went to the motel and showed
the manager a picture of Edmondson; he said there was a resemblance
to one of the men in the room. An agent approached the vehicle
parked in front of the room and through the window read a number
on the back of the rear view mirror which substantially complied with
the car rental identification number. The court held that these facts
known to the agents established probable cause for an arrest. 213
In Colosino v. Perini2 4 an observer in an airport control tower
witnessed the petitioner stealing from cars in the airport parking lot.
This information was relayed to officers on the ground who promptly
made an arrest. The court held that the arrest was supported by
1)robable cause. Similarly, officers can rely on information received
21
friom official sources, such as radio broadcasts, to justify an arrest. 5
Also calling for a particular evaluation of the information known
to the arresting officer was Greer v. State,2 1 where the two defendants
were convicted of the robbery of a bus driver. The driver gave the
)olice a physical description of both defendants. An officer recog210. Id. at 91.

211. 404 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1968).

212. This was apparently a false lead.
213. Other aspects of this case are discussed in text accompanying notes 293, 300
infra.

214. 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969).
215. Nix v. State, 446 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); United States v. Johnson,
403 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Clemmons, 390 F.2d
407 (6th Cir. 1968). This, of course, assumes that the aggregate knowledge of
the police reaches the level of probable cause.
216. 443 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
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nized one of the descriptions as fitting Greer. Particularly significant
was the fact that the robber had been wearing sunglasses during the
robbery which occurred at around midnight. The officer "had had
previous experience with Greer and knew that he wore sunglasses at
all times, both day and night." 2 17 Further, the officer had received
an anonymous telephone call implicating Greer in the robbery. The
court concluded that the arrest was valid. As regards the factual description of the assailant, Judge Galbreath argued, in dissent,
that this was so vague that it could have fit "hundreds, perhaps thousands, of men" in the general area of the crime. 2 18 It was further
noted that the description had missed the actual weight of Greer
by between twenty and forty pounds.
Lending some support to the argument of the dissent is the recent
United States Supreme Court decision of Davis v. Mississippi,2 19
wherein following a rape, the victim described her assailant as simply
a "Negro youth," and numerous people fitting that general description
were taken into custody and fingerprinted. While the focus of attention in the Davis decision is on the "dragnet" operation, it would
seem apparent that if but one person were arrested who met the description "Negro youth," apart from the unlikely chance that only
one person met that description in the community, the arrest would
be illegal. While the description in Greer is somewhat more detailed,
if the dissent is correct in suggesting it could fit hundreds of people
or more, the problem is equivalent; in Davis between sixty-four and
seventy-four were either fingerprinted or questioned, or both.
As regards the tip received from the anonymous informant, it is
clearly established that probable cause cannot be based on such information standing alone, 22 0 and so the majority conceded. 22 1 But, it
217. Id. at 684.
218. Id. at 688. "Not only do a significant number of people, because of visual
sensitivity, wear dark glasses but it is well known that many perpetrators of
personal crimes wear such a masking device to obscure from witnesses their
identity. Even more prevalent is the custom on the part of young people,
particularly, of the Negro race, in this generation to wear such 'shades,' as they

are called, in their imitation of well known musicians and entertainment personalities, such as Ray Charles, Sammy Davis, Jr., and others whom have caused
dark glasses to become a badge of the 'in-crowd.'
"While the fact that the bandit wore dark glasses, coupled with the fact

that Greet wore dark glasses, should have afforded the officer a clue from which
further investigation should have been mounted, it presented no more basis for
probable cause to arrest than would have information that the robber was
wearing a derby hat; perhaps not as much so as derby hats have become much
rarer in our times than have sun glasses." Id.
219. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). See also text accompanying notes 240-42 infra.
220. See, e.g., Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Katz v. Peyton,
334 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1964); Swinney v. United States, 391 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1968).

221. 443 S.W.2d at 684.

1970]

CRIMINAL LAW IN

TENNESSEE

held, such a tip may still be "added to the mix" in making the ultimate determination of probable cause.2 2 Reliance is here placed on
Spinelli v. United States22 3 which, however, involved the use of inforination from a known informant, alleged to be reliable, whose inforination was unsubstantial in itself to establish probable cause because
of its conclusory nature and for want of factual allegations establish22 4
ing his reliability.
Finally, note should be taken of the argument in dissent that the
arresting officer "candidly admitted he had no reasonable information
on which to base an arrest, '"225 that he was simply "playing a hunch."
The argument runs that if the officer himself did not believe he had
probable cause, it does not behoove the court to hold he did. However, it is submitted that the answer here is not as simple as the dissent would suggest. On one hand, it is unquestionably the case that
the good faith of the officer is immaterial in determining whether
he had probable cause to support an arrest 2 " -it is a matter of objective determination. There is some confusion as to the validity of
an arrest where the officer concedes that he did not believe that he
had probable cause at the time he made the arrest, but the court, objectively examining the facts, concludes that he did. In Carroll v.
United States,2 2 7 the United States Supreme Court said,
The usual rule is that a police officer may arrest without warrant
one believed by the2 8officer upon reasonable cause io have been
2
guilty of a felony.
This
cause
acted
other

language may be construed to mean not only that probable
must objectively exist but further that the officer must have
in good faith, and at least one court has so held. 2 2
On the
hand Terry v. Ohio23o suggests that the existence of probable

222. See also tUnited States %. Canty, 297 F. Supp. 853 (D. 1).C. 1969).
223. 393 IS. 410 (1969). See text accompanying notes 246-53 infra.
224. See t'nited States %7.Barnett, 407 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1969), for a more appropriate use of Sji'Illi in this context.
225. 443 S.AV.2d at 688.
226. Director of General Railroads %. Kasteibatim, 263 t'.S.25, 27-28 (1923); Henry
%. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
227. 267 ('.S.132 (1925).
228. Id. at 156.
229. Winkle v. Kropp, 279 F. Stipp. 532, 537 (1). Mich. 1968) ("The use of the
Sprudent
man test' . . . should not obscure the point that it is the belief of the
officer which is being tested for its reasonableness .
l..
]I this case, the officer
specifically denied having believed that any offense other than the traffic
violation had occured and stated no helief that a search of the trunk would
disclose relevant etidence. Hence, tie question of what a prtlent ian wotld
have believed under the circumstances does not even arise."). See also Massachusetts s. Painten, 3189 U.S. 560 (1968).
230. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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cause is purely an objective question, " a t and this has been interpreted
by one court to mean that the officer's subjective evaluation of his
conduct is immaterial, even when he believes he is making an illegal
arrest.

23 2

It is futile to suggest that the Greer decision is correct or incorrect. It presents a not infrequent situation in which prudent men
may differ. The unqualified success of the officer in his conclusion
that Greer was the guilty part)' may be attributed to excellent police
work and warrant commendation in the form of sustaining the validity
of the arrest. Yet the admonition of the dissent is worthy of constant
recognition:

The fact that this time the hunch paid off should not blind
ts to the fact that many such hunches would prove worthless
and subject many innocent citizens to the type of harassment
forbidden by the Fotrteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitu tion.233
2. Effect of an Illegal Arrest. An illegal arrest, that is, an uLnreasonable seizure of the person, is tnquestionably a violation of the
fourth amendment.2 3 4 Yet, it is equally clear that an illegal arrest
without more (toes not constitute reversible error.2 3-5 The explanation
231. "The scheme of tile Fourth Amendment hecoiics meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of these charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances.
And in making that assessment it is imperative that
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to
the officer at the mttoment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a mal of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Id. at 21-22.
232. Klinger v. Unitecd States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir. 1969) ("Because probable
cause for an arrest is determined 1) objective facts, it is immaterial that Kisecker,
at the hearing ott the motion to suppress, testified that he did not think that
he had 'enough facts' upon which to arrest Klinger for armed robbery.
His
suhijective opinion is not material.").
233. 4l-13 S.V.2d at 688.
See also the yet-unreported case. Tolden v. State, 5 CRIM. L. REp. 2088 (Tenn.
Crii. App.. April 16. 1969), where Galhreath, J.. the dissenter in Creer, spoke for
the court in holding tileinformation received from an informant inadequate to
support allarrest.
lhere the infornation rceived was that all "old nodel green
Buick'' would pass thiough a gien intersection. driven by a Negro male with a
physical defect, and that the automobile would contain two or three gallons of
illegal liquor. *'It is apparent that any colored man driving an old green
Buick automobile through the intersection while the officers were there would
have been arrested. Although the officers recognized the defendant when he did
appear, they had no information as to his identification while they waited. To
permit such tactics would subject coutitless innocent people to harassment and
would be violative of the Fourth Amendment."
234. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927): Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480 (1958): Henry %. Tnited States, 361 t.S. 98 (1959).
235. Ker v. Illinois. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See Annot., 96 A.L.R. 982 (1935).
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for these seemingly contradictory principles rests on the fact that
judgments are reversed because of unfairness in the trial. An illegal
236
It
arrest does not in and of itself affect the fairness of the trial.
may, of course, affect it in the sense that the defendant might otherwise never have been caught, and thus the court would not have
gained jurisdiction of the case, but the courts have never deemed this
argument persuasive. ' : 7 Were it accepted, the result would be either
that because of this illegal arrest the defendant is now immune from
prosecution, a conclusion with little to recommend it, or the defendant must be released and re-arrested in a legal manner. But
where we are considering cases at the appellate level, this would seem
a singularly pointless ritual-if the prosecution has presented a case
strong enough to convict, it is patently obvious that they now have
and have had at some point along the way adequate probable cause
to make a legal arrest. Thus the defendant could be re-arrested at
the very moment he received his liberty. 2 a3 The want of significance
of an illegal arrest for purposes of appellate review was acknowledged
239
in Manier v. Henderson.
More serious constitutional problems arise, however, when the de240
fendant claims the use of the "fruits" of his illegal arrest at his trial.
A (Juestion of this variety cane before the United States Supreme
Court in Davis v. Mississippi.241 The "fruits" in this case was a set
of fingerprints introduced at the trial of the defendant for rape. The
defendant had been taken into custody along with twenty-four others
following the crime, briefly interrogated and fingerprinted. The Court
had no difficulty in finding that the detention amounted to an illegal
236. "When the Court is asked to reverse a state court conviction as wanting in due
process, illegal acts of state officials prior to trial are relevant only as they bear
on petitioner's contention that he has been deprived of a fair trial."
Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1952).
237. "[11n criminal cases the interests of the public override that which is, after all,
a mere privilege from arrest." Ex parte Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 126 (1897).
See also Mahon %. Justice. 127 '.S. 700 (1888): Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183 (1892);
Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 t '.S.537 (1893): Frisbie N. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
238. One would he hard pressed to find a more convincing statement of probable
cause than that the defendant has been convicted of the crime fot which he is
being arrested in a trial free of error.
239. 442 S.V.2d 281 (Tenn. Crini. App. 1969). The court's statement. "There is no
constitutional immunity from an unlawftt I arrest (ld. at 282)," is misleading.
As previously indicated, there is here a constitutional deprivation: it is simply
viewed as a form of harmless error. See also In re Lollis, 291 F. Supp. 615
(E.D. Ten. 1968): State r. Johnson, 216 Tenn. 531, 393 S.W.2d 135 (1965); State
N. State. 219 Tenn. 80, 407 S.WV.2d 165 (1966).
oVng Sun v. inited States, 371 tIS. 471 (1963).
240. The most notorious case is
See generally Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-the Fourth Amendotent and
the Exclusionarv Rule, 55 J. CRLIt.L.C. F, P.S. 307 (1964).
241. 394 U.S. 721 (1069).
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arrest. It required no elaboration to demonstrate that the fingerprints were "tainted" by the illegal arrest and therefore the judgment was reversed. One argument raised in dissent was analogous
to the simple illegal arrest rationale-since the fingerprints could now
legally be obtained, any error should be deemed harmless. However,
froin the perspective of the effect of the error on the trial of the
defendant, it was clearly not harmless, being crucial to placing the
defendant at the scene of the crime.
E.

Search and Seizure

1. Scarch Warramts. In 19Ii in Aguilar v. Texas" 43 officers sought
the issuance of a search warrant with an affidavit which read in
material part as follows:

Affiants have received reliable infornmation from a credible
person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and
other narcotics and narcotic para)hernalia are being kept at
the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use
44
contrary to the provisions of the law.2
The petitioner, who was convicted of the illegal possession of heroin,
challenged the validity of the search warrant. The United States
Supreme Court held that the search warrant was invalid as it was
based on the "mere conclusion" of the officer and in effect removed
front the magistrate the prerogative of making an independent judgment of the facts alleged to determine if probable cause to issue the
2
waTant existed. ..
2 4s
The Aguilar probleit arose again in Spinelli v. United States,
wherein the CoU- deemed it -desirable that the principles of Aguilar
should be further explicated.' In Spinc/li the affidavit contained essentially the following allegations:
(I)The FBI had kept t surveillance of the suspect's movements on five daxs, during which time he was observed to cross

two bridges and piak in a lot used by an apartment house. On
one occasion he was observed to enter a particular apartment.
2-t2. "[-Jo argue that the touotth .Amendment does not apply

stage is fundameh latt to nisconceive the

to the investigatory

po OSCSof the Fourth Amendment.

Ilvestigatory seizIreIs Would sitthject tunlimited ntmbeis of innocent persons
to the harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention.
Nothing is
more deai thani
thatthe Foutl'h Atlnelldnitt was miieanit to prevent wholesale
intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions
he teried 'arrests' or iivestigatory detentions'." /d. at 726-27.

243. 374 t S. 108 (196,4).
2-14.
1d. at 109.
2t5. Followed in t'nitcdStates v. Ventiesca, 380 t'.S.102 (1965). See also Byars v.
V'tited States. 273 1'.S.
28 (19)27): (;rau s. Uniited States, 287 1.S. 124 (1932).
216. 393 U .S.410 (1969).
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(2) The apartment in question was known to contain two
telephones.
(3) The suspect was known to be "a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers.'
.(4) The FBI had "been informed by a confidential reliable
informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and
accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by
means of the telephones.'
In holding the affidavit insuffiicient the Court found that (1) and
(2) reflected no incriminating actions at all.2 7 Nor was the fact
that the SUS)ect was "known" to be a gambler of sign ificance in determining probable catuse. 2
The onlly remaining basis for the issuance of the warrant, then, was (4). It was the position of the government that the informant's tip, corroborated by the aforementioned
information, established probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant.

The Court was of the opinion that the tip must first be evaluated
in and of itself. If it, standing alone, did not satisfy the requirements
of Agtilar, then the Court would dleteirmine if the cumnulative affect
of the corroboratory data established probable cause. Even at this
poit, however, Agitilar provided the guide for the determination of
adleq uacy. As the Cout foinulated the test:
Can it fairly be said that his tip, even when certain parts of it
have been corroborated by independent souirces, is as trustworthy
as a tip which2 4 would pass Aguilar's test without independent
Col obo ation?

11

As regards the first consideration, it was cleam that the tip standing
alone would not afford adequate girotindls foi the issuance of the

247.

"Spinelli's

travel to and from the apartment building and his entry into a parOcular apartment on one occasion could hardly he taken as I)espeaking gambling
acti'it: and there is surcl nothing tusual about an apartment containing
two separate tclephto es.' Id. at 41-1.

248. -[A] bald and tnilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight
in appraising the magistrate's decision." Id. S e also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
91 (1964); Catroll v. I'nitcd States, 267 1 S. 132, 174 (1925) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting): Clt v. I ited States, 239 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 863 (1957).
249. Id. at 115. -Aguilar is relevant at this stage of the inquiry as wsell because the
tests it esta)lishes \'ere designed to implement the long standing principle that
probable cause must be determined by a 'neutral and detached magistrate,' and
not by 'the officer engaged itt the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
A magistrate cancrime.' Johnson \. United States, 333 t.S. M0,14 . . . (1948).
not be said to have properly discharged his constitutional duty if he relies on
an informer's tip which -- even when partially corroborated-is not as reliable
as one which passes Aguilar's requireients when standing alone." Id. at 415-16.
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2 50
warrant for want of any allegation as to the informant's reliability.
Furthermore, the Court held, '[t]he tip does not contain a sufficient
statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer
concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation."2 5 1 Thus
not only may a warrant not be issued on the mere conclusion of the
officer requesting the warrant, as in Aguilar; it likewise may not be
issued on the mere conclusion of the reliable informant. Either the
informant must indicate how he came about his information, or the
criminal activity must be described "in sufficient detail so that the
magistrate will know that he is relying on something more substantial
than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation
based merely on an individual's general reputation." 52- On the basis
of this standard the tip alleged in the Spinelli case was clearly inadequate to establish probable cause, nor were the corroborating alle25 3
gations sufficient to establish reliability.

Several subsequent sixth circuit decisions have involved the application of Spinelli.2 54 In United States v. Kidd2 5 the officer alleged that the informant had "proved to be reliable on many occasions in the immediate past," and on this occasion had advised
him that he had seen moonshine whiskey in the possession of the
defendant. The court, noting the desirability of encouraging officers
250. See generally Draper %. tUnited States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960): Ker v. California, 374 I'.S. 23 (1963); McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967); Recznik v. City of Lorraine, 393 U.S. 166 (1968).
251. 394 t .S.at 416. And see Justice White concurring: "If an officer swears that
there is gambling equipment at a certain address, the possibilities are (1) that
he has seen the equipment; (2) that he has observed or perceived facts from
which the presence of the equipment may reasonably be inferred; and (3) that
he has obtained the information from someone else. If (1) is true, the affidavit
is good. But in (2) the affidavit is insufficient unless the perceived facts are
given, for it is the magistrate, not the officer, who is to judge the existence of
probable cause. . . . With respect to (3), where the officer's information is hearsay, no warrant should issue absent good cause for crediting that hearsay."
Id. at 423-24.
252. Id. at 416. Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), where allegations were
based on personal observations of the informant.
253. The Court compared the present case with Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959), which it refered to as "a suitable benchmark." There, the Court felt,
the corroborating information was far more extensive that that in the present
case. In a concurring opinion, Justice White was convinced that the Nathanson
and Aguilar decisions (and implicitly the present decision) were irreconciable with
the Draper decision, and the subject was in need of a "full scale reconsideration."
Id. at 429. Justice Black offered a vigorous dissent in which he reiterated his
dislike for the Aguilar decision and contended that the present holding was even
worse. Justices Fortas and Stewart also dissented.
254. See also United States %. Harris, 412 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1969).
255. 407 F.2d 1316 (6th Cir. 1969).

1970]

CRIMINAL LAW IN

TENNESSEE

475

257
256
concluded that the affidavit was sufficient.
to obtain warrants,
DiPiazza v. United States258 held that it is unnecessary to establish
the reliability and credibility of the informant where there is sufficient
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant independent of the
tip, and this is true even if the tip was the initiating factor in the
investigation. In United States v. Nolan "5 9 the court held that when
two affidavits for search warrants relating to the same criminal activity
are filed contemporaneously, the validity of either warrant will be
sustained if the two affidavits read together satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli
2 60
standard.

One consideration in the determination of probable cause to issue
a search warrant that is absent in the determination of probable cause
to issue and arrest warrant is timeliness. While an affidavit seeking
an arrest warrant is required to establish the probability of a past
fact, that is, the commission of a crime, that will not change with the
passage of time, an affidavit for a search warrant alleges a present
fact, that is, the probability of the presence of specified items at a
given location at the time the warrant is sought. This is, of course,
a fact that is subject to change, and therefore the lapse of time between the facts alleged in the affidavit and the time of filing the
affidavit is a material factor in the determination of whether the
2 62
26 1
The recent decision of Franklin v. State
warrant should issue.
held that an interval of seventeen days did not preclude a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, although the court
acknowledged that "[t]he nearer the time of the application for the

256. See also United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1965).
257. It may be argued that a "mere conclusion" as regards the informant's reliability is
no more acceptable than a "mere conclusion' as regards the commission of the
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 38(1 F.2d 356, 358 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 t.S. 943 (1967). ("[I]twould he better practice if affidavits also
contained statemients of the length of time the agent had known and dealt with
the informant and the approximate number of times information had been received from the informiant."): Edmondson v. t nited States. 402 F.2d 809 (10th Cir.
1968). Cf. tUnited States v. Eisner. 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962): Price v. State,
254 A.2d 219 (Md. App. 1969).
258. -115 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969).
259. 413 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969).
260. The court was somewhat bothered by the fact that in reference to the challenged
warrant the issuing magistrate indicated that he had considered the affidavit
(nt
affidavits) of the officer, but concluded, "the exclusionary rtile was not
designed to correct the administrative errors of a United States Commissioner."
Id. at 854. See also Commonwealth v. Saville, 353 Mass. 458, 233 N.E.2d 9 (1968).
261. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932); Annots., 162 A.L.R. 406 (1946),
100 A.L.R.2d 525 (1965).
262. 437 S.W.2d 26(0 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
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search warrant the more effective it is to justify a conclusion of prob2 -6
able cause.''
2. Incident to Arrest. Unquestionably the most significant decision by the United States Supreme Court during the past year, in
terms of practical impact on law enforcement and the rights of the
26 4
accused, was Chimel v. California.
The petitioner was arrested at
his home pisuant to a warrant for the burglary of a coin shop and
the officers proceeded to carry out a search of the premises incident
to the arrest. "IT]he officers then looked through the entire threebedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. '"'26 A number of items were seized in the search which lasted
between forty-five minutes and an hour. Quoting language from
Terry v. Ohio "6 1! that "the police must whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,'''2 7 the Court concluded that the present search was
unreasonable. The constitutional restrictions on searches incident to
arrest were enunciated thus:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape....
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might search in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must of cotIrse, be
governed by a like rule.
Any warrantless search incident to an arrest which proceeds beyond
these limitations is constitutionally unreasonable.2 6 '1 In so concluding the Court departed from a long line of precedent 27' which had
made the warrantless search incident to an arrest the most useful of
2 71
police investigative tools.
263. Id. at 262. See also Waggener v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 258, 191 S.V.2d 551 (1946).
264. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
265. Id. at 754.
266. 392 U.S. t (,968).

267. ld. at 20.
268. 395 U.S. at 762-63.
269. -There is no comparable justification . . . for routinely searching rooms other
than that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through
all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in the room itself."
Id. at 763.
270. Notably, Harris v. United States. 331 1.S. 145 (1947) and United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).

271. It ma, be anticipated that efforts will he made h) lower courts to mitigate
against the strict application of Chimel. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 256 A.2d 384
(Md. App. 1969), where the court interprets within "reach" ito mean within
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Two other cases decided by the Court on the same day as Chimel
are worthy of note. In Von Cleef v. New Jersey,27'- incident to an
arrest the officers searched the entire sixteen-room house in which
the petitioners lived for some three hours, seizing several thousand
articles. The Court found the search unreasonable under the preChimel standard.27 3 In Shipley v. California274 the petitioner was
arrested as he alighted from his car which he parked fifteen or twenty
feet fiom the house. After searching him and the car, the officers
then entered the house and searched it.275 Again, the Court held that
this search could not be justified an incident to the arrest under pre2 76
Chimel standards.
3. Consent. An exception to the requirement of search warrants
is found in those cases where valid consent was given by the party in
interest to the search, 27 7 and consent given by a co-occul)ant of the
premises having equal access to the area searched may effectively waive
the rights of the defendant. "2 7s In Frazier v. Cnpp,2 7 .1 the United
States Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to the effectiveness
of consent given by the petitioner's cousin for the search of a duffel
bag jointly used by the two. It was the contention of the petitioner
that his cousin only had the use of one compartment of the duffel bag
and therefore lacked the consent to a search of other compartments.
The Stpreme Cottrt declined to "engage in such metaphysical subtleties" in determining the validity of the search and held the consent
valid.
t. Hot Pursuit. A warrantless search may be held reasonable
where officers are in "hot pl3rsuit'' of a stIspect.8 s'1 Such a situation
was presented in United States v. De Bose.2 8 I Following a bank robbery, an officer was trailing an automobile which he suspected as being stolen, not having associated it with the robbery. When the car
was parked, the officer stopped nearby, intending to check the license
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

395 U.S. 814 (1969).
See Kremen %-.l'nited States. 353 U'.S.346 (1957).
395
.S.818 (1969).
A prCvious search of the house, tot in issue here, was made with the consent
of the petitioner's wife.
"[T]he Constitution has never been construed by this Court to allow the police,
in the absence of an emergency, to arrest a person outside his home and then take
him inside for the purpose of conducting a warrantless search." Id. at 820.
See 1968 Survey at 245-47. And see Lloyd %. State, 440 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn.Crim.
App. 1969).
See genierally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078: Comment, 70 l)tcK. L. REv. 510 (1966);
Comment, 1967 WASH. U. 1.. Q. 12.
394 U.S. 731 (1969).
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
410 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1969).
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to determine if it was stolen. One of the occupants thereupon fired
two shots at the officer. The office" returned the fire, and the two
suspects f'led clown an alley. \'Vhen other officers arrived at the scene,
they were told by a bystander that the men had entered a roolning
house through a back door. The hose was then thoroughly searched,
but the suspects were not found, nor was any evidence seied. The
identity of one of the suspects was determined by this search, however. While conceding that nothing seized at this tine was introduced
in evidence, the defendant contended that the fruits of the search
led the officers to other evidence. Noting that there was no specification
of just what these fruits of the search were. the cou1t held that it
nade no difference. as the search was reasonable since the officers
entered the premises in "hot purstit" to search for tile suspects or
their weapons.
5. VWhileb Se'arh. Searches of vehicles have received exceptional
treatinent in terms of fourth aitendnent reasonableness. Carroll v.
UtnieCd S/ taes,2 2 a case decided cuing the itrohibition cra, held that
a warrantless search of a vehicle was reasonable where officers had
probable cause to believe it contaimed contraband. It is frectiently
noted that the inherent niobiity of the ehicle inay justify ptript
action 1y the officetr, s \Varrantless searches continue to be apptroved
in situations analogouts to Carr0ll. -S4
,,Vhetre a search of a vehicle is .justified as incident to an arrest.
there titust be first, a relationship between the subject of the arrest
and the search anld second, contemporaniet
of the search to the
arrest. A search lailcd in regarld to both re q uitenents in the 1963
decision, Preston a. Uniled S'aeCs."-s' There the suspctts were arrested
for vagrancy and afler they were taken to jail their automobile was
searched, as a result of which bttglaty pt-al)hernalia was found in
tWe timlnk. The Corti held the search unreasonable because the arrest
had been accoulilished long before the searcl occurred, and titheritoe. as there ate no fruits or instrUICIntaities of the criie of
vagrancy no search could be reasonably justified as incident thereto,
other than that necessatry lot the protection of the arresting officer
Preston is IreCluentl distinguished where there is a closer proxittity
between arrest and search, and the search would have been reasonable
282. 267 I'S. 132 (1924).
283. Sec Preston v. tited States. 376 1 S. 364 (1964): U'nitcd States N. Barnett, 4.07
F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1969) (dicta).
284. 'niled States v. IM (kter, 26 F. Supp. 121 (E.. Tenn. 1968): t'nited Stlis v.
Thompson, 409 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1969).
285. 376 U.S. 364 (1963).
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had it been immediately consumnsated.2" 6 In Alvey v. State2 8 7 the defendants were arrested in their automobile four blocks from a burglarized drug store, in front of which the vehicle had been seen parked.
They were placed in a police car and returned to the scene of the
btglary. The court found the search of the automobile some twentyfive minutes later reasonable.
It is not clear what effect, if any, Chimel v. California28 has on
the vehicle search cases. While Chimel expressly acknowledged the
2
continued vitality of Carroll,
8" the impact on Preston-type searches
is uncertain. Colosioto v. Peribi 2 90 would appear to be the first case
to deem the Chioiel decision gerimane to vehicle searches with the
result that reasonable contenporaniety is not enough to validate the
2 1

seach.

A further justification for the warrantless search of a vehicle was
recognized in a 1966 decision, Cooper v. California.2 9 2 There, contemporaneous with an arrest for narcotics violations, the police took
a vehicle used in the offense into custody. The seizure was authorized
by statute because the vehicle was subject to forfeiture. At a later
time an inventor y was made of the contents of the car, and evidence
of a wholly unrelated crime was discovered. The Court held that
since the police has lawful custody of the vehicle, an inventory of its
contelits was reasonable. Analogously, in United States v. Kucinich,29.
where the defendants had been arrested for the theft of an automobile
and officers took possession of the automobile on behalf of the owner,
the search of the vehicle was reasonable.
6. Standing to Obiect. The right protected by the fourth amendmeut is a personal right. 2 94 and therefore in order to object to the
aldmission of illegally seized evidence, the defendant must show that
t nited States v. Barnett, 407 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1969).
443 S.W.2d 518 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
395 1 .S. 752 (1969). See text accompanying notes 264-76 supra.
"Our holding today is of course entirely consistent with the recognized principle
that, assuming the existence of prohable cause, automobiles and other vehicles
may he searched without warrants 'where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly Moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant intist be sotIght.'"
Id. at 764 n.9 (citing Carroll).
290. -115 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969).
291. "With the person, or persons, suspected of crime and the atitomobile to be
searched both in police custody, the precipitous action of a warrantless search
is no longer justified. It is true that in Preston the %ehicle was searched at a
286.
287.
288.
289.

point away from the scene of arrest, while here the vehicle remained at the
place %%,her-e the defendant was arrested.
Chimel, however, persuades
such factual distinction is not of controlling importance." Id. at 806.
292. "186 1 .. 58 (1966).
293. 404 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1968).
294. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925).

us that
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he had some interest in the property seized 29 5 or the premises
searched.2 6 The defendant will be held to fall within the first category
if the offense with which he is charged is the possession of the very
evidence he claims was illegally seized. - 97 To come within the second
category it is not essential that the defendant have a property interest in the premises. "Anyone legitimately on pretnises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality."25 A different result will be reached
where the court concludes the suspect did not qualify as a "guest"
or "invitee" at the time of the search. Thus in United States v. Gregg299
the defendant was held to lack standing to object to a search of a
closet in an unrented motel room where he was found hiding, and in
o
United States v. Kncinich3"0
the defendant would not be heard to
object to the search of the trunk of an automobile he had stolen after
the vehicle had been retaken by the police on behalf of the owner. 0 1
F.

Right to Counsel

1. Determination of Indigency. A corollary to the right to counsel
guaranteed by the sixth amendment is the right to the use of other
legal mechanisms designed to insure due process of law. Specifically,
in Griffin v. Illinois,302 the United States Suprene Court held that if
a state made trial transcripts available to those able to afford them
for the preparation of an appeal, transcripts must be provided by the
state to an indigent defendant. This constitutional standard has been
3
implemented by statute. 3 11
While there is no specific language indicating how eligibility for the benefits of the statute is to be determined,
Elliott v. State:114 held that upon application for a free transcript it

295. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
296. See Jones v. United States, 362

U.S. 257

(1960);

Manctusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.

364 (1968).
297. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Followed in Colosimo v. Perini,
415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969).
298. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 267. See also United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951).
299. 403 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968).
300. 404 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1968).
301. The question of standing to object to evidence obtained by means of electronic
eavesdrop was considered in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the
Court concluding that a party would have standing if he was a participant in
the overheard conversation or if the conversation took place on his premises,
even if he were not himself a participant.
302. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
303. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2037, 40-2040
304. 135 S.W.2d 812

(Tenn.

1968).

(Supp. 1969).
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is the duty of the trial judge to conduct a hearing to determine in3 05
digency.
2. "Jailhouse Lawyers." In Johnson v. Avery 30 6 the petitioner, an
inmate in the Tennessee State Penitentiary, had been active in assisting fellow inmates in the preparation of pleadings to attack judgments.
Because the practice was in violation of a prison regulation, 307 the
petitioner had been transferred to the maximum security building and
denied access to law books and a typewriter. A federal district court
held that the regulation was void because it effectively prevented
illiterate inmates from seeking federal habeas corpus.308 The court
of appeals reversed, holding that the regulation was a legitimate device for the maintenance of prison discipline, notwithstanding the incidental effect it might have on others in attempting to attack these
convictions.30,1' The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. Recognizing the fundamental importance of the writ of
habeas corpus, 35 0 the Court concluded that the regulation in question
as effectively denied illiterate prisoners of the opportunity to file
habeas corpus petitions as if they had simply been prohibited from
doing so.
The Johnson case does not hold that the petitioner had the right
to practice law; the Court simply said that under the circumstances
alleged allowing the petitioner to provide assistance to inmates was
the only means of assuring the protection of their rights.3 1 "[U]nless
and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to assist in305. There are no constitutional guidelines as to what constitutes indigency.
The
unreported case, Johnson v. State, 4 CR5IM. L. REP. 2342 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jan.
8, 1969), held that the ability of the defendant to post bond did not preclude
a finding of indigency.
306. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
307. "No inmate will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid another, either with
or without a fee, to prepare writs or other legal matters. It is not intended
that an innocent man be punished. When a man believes he is unlawfully held
or illegally convicted, he should prepare a brief or state his complaint in letter
form and address it to his lawyer or a judge. A formal Writ is not necessary
to receive a hearing.
False charges or untrue complaints may be punished.
inmates are forbidden to set themselves up as practitioners for the purpose of
promoting a business of writing Writs." Id. at 484.
308. Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
309. Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967).
310. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
The petitioner is given relief on the
311. This is a curious aspect of the case.
allegation of a deprivation of rights of others. It would seem that the proper
case would be brought by an inmate who was himself prejudiced by the iegulation. But the very nature of the problem renders such a case impossibleonce a petitioner has gotten before a court he has thereby repudiated the need
for the "jailhouse lawyer."
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mates in tile pireparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it may
-3
not validly enforce a regulation stich as that here in issue.'' '2
3. Effective Assistance. With the right to counsel, at least in felony
cases, now firmly established, : : increasing attention is being directed
to the quality of assistance a defendant receives.31 4 The right of effective assistance of counsel clearly (toes not entitle an indigent to de3
imand that a par-ticular attorney be appointed to represent him. '1
While a case for ineffective assistance
niay be established by a lack of
Idequate time to prepare the case, a 1t! it is requisite that the defendant
demonstrate actual prej udice. :"12 Rarely will a court find ineffective
assistance of counsel where the defendant's complaint extends to matters of trial strategy. In Hayes v. Russell, 3 s8 the court held that it
would have to be demonstrated that what "was (lone or not (lone b\
the attorney for his client nade the proceedings a farce and a mockery
of justice, shocking to the conscience of the Cour t.'' : " Tennessee
courts have repeatedly taken the position that where the defendant
retained his own counsel, he will not be heard to complain of ineffec:
tive assistance, because no state action is involved. 20
312. 393 t .S. at 491. An n leresting potential issue in respect to the effective assistante of counsel (see text accomipanying notes 313-32, infra) is presented by the
decision.
Suppose an iinmate avails himself of the services of his "jailhouse
lawevr," and his effors are itnsuccessful.
Might lie suhseqnent ll claim ineffective assistance of counsel. contending that the services of an untrained, unlicensed, colicted felon, inligile for tie Iar. could hardlI he deemed adequate.
The prohlei may hie conllicated i
the added factior that the "jailhouse lawyer"
is retained rather than appoitied"counsel.
See tex
accompanying note 320

infra.

313. Gideon v. \\ainwiight, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
314. See 1968 .Survey at 250-51.
315. tnited States v. Muphy, 413 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Rauliersoit V.
Patterson, 272 F. Supp. 495 (1). Colo. 1967).
316. See 1968 Strve), at 251).
317. United States s. Sisk, 411 F.2d 1192 (61th Cit. 1939). See also State ex tel.
Edmondson \. Hendetson. 220 Ienn. 605, ,t21 S.W.2d 635 (1967).
318. -0
F.2d 859 (6th CiI. 1969).
319. Id. at 860. See alto O'Malley v. I nited Stales. 285 F.2d 733 (61h (ir. 1961). Itt
Schaber v. Maxwell. 348 F.2d 661 (6th Cit. 1965). such a failre was found where
counsel failed to file a wrillten plea ttf not guiltv h\ icason of insanit\. thereby
creating a conclhsive I)restt~lplioll Of Saltitl and Ithen attenmpled to establish
the defense at trial.
320. State ex rel. Jennings \. Henderstt, 443 S.V.2d 835 (Tenn. Crito. App. 1969);
Morgan v. State, 445 S.W.2d -177 (Tlenn. Crin. App. 1969). See 1968 Surve' at 251.
But see \Villiatnson \. Stale. i CRIM. L. REP. 2141 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct.
16, 1969): "'The trial court dismiissed tle habeas corpus petitions largely on the
gronnd that retained Cttulsel's inisrepresetatihions ate not 'state action' against
which relief can he granted. This is not a sufficient ground for rejecting the
petition. \We are intpressed b the rule ttf Rice v. Davis, 336 S.W.2d 153 (K).
1963), that a defendant can Ite as imitch prejudiced by itneffeciivc assistance of
retailned cutinsel as IOs that of appointed coUnsel."
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A unique assistance of counsel issue was raised in United States v.
The defendant was adequately represented by appointed

Saihj/1.32

counsel up to the point of the return of the jury verdict. At this time,
some two days after the jury had begun deliberations, the court was
advised that counsel for the defendant was ill and could not be present
in court. Tie trial judge nevertheless called upon the jury for their
verdict, which was guilty. The issue, apparently never previouisly considered in the Sixth Circuit, was whether the involuntary absence of
(efense counsel at the time of the rettrn of the jury verdict was a
denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Authority from other
jurisdictions was in conflict. Two fifth circuit decisions held the
absence of counsel to be inconsequential; :'-'2a tenth circuit holding
viewed the matter as reversible error.323
Relying on United States v. HVade, 2- 4 the coUrt concluded that the
defendant had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. The
Ilade decision recognized the right to counsel at a lineup identifitation because it was a critical stage in the proceedings. The court
here held that the return of the verdict was equally critical.3 2
Addhessing itself to the nature of the potential prejudice inherent in the
situaion, the C0oth-t noted that the fact that the trial judge had polled
the jmty did not eliminate the possibility of assistance frot counsel.
From a reading of the record it is impossible to determine the
lone (If voice of the jurors when the) individtually announced
their decision, the hesitancy of their responses, and other possibilitics that could have taken place and had significant meaning.
Had counsel been pl esent anti something of this nattire occurred,
the defendant wonuld have had the benefit of his legal advice. 32 6
321. -t1

F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1969).
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1941), rett. denied, 315 U.S. 799 (1949);
Martin \. t nired States, 182 1.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892
(1950).
loth of these cases involved the "voluntary' absence of counsel, a
distilctioll Which is tderlined
by the Court in the principal case.
However,
the difference would seem immaterial, since it is the defendant's right we are

122. kent \. Sanford. 121

concerned with.

Once it

is delerminet

I hal

the

rendering of

the verdict

is a

"criical stage" in the proceeding. unless
h11imsett
r

323.
32-1.

the

CtliISIalCCS

sIriolllIllg

there is a waiver 1)) the defendant
tie absence of cotnsel would seem ir-

ev ant.

Thomas %. HI- ei, 153 F.gd 834 (10th Cir. 1946).
'x tlaccompanying notes
388 1 .s. 218 (1967). SIc

331 eI seq. infla.

325. "To consider the point of the proceedings as 'non-critical' is to take an ntrealistic iew of a criminal prosecution. Little imagination is required to foresee
situations in

which the lights or the position of the accused could be prejudiced

1)%failure to hae the 'guiding hand of counsel* at the moment when the jury
retirns its verdict." 411 F.2d at 736.
326. Id. at 736-37. In the onl1 related IVnited States Supreme Court decision, Frank
\.Mangum, 2137 t S. 309 (1915). the ttcfendant antd his counsel were advised
101(1 prior to the rendering of the verdict because of
Io teasc the Court
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In United States v. Long 3" 7 three defendants were represented by
the same appointed counsel and all were convicted of escaping from a
federal correctional institution. 32
It was argued on appeal that they
had been denied effective assistance of counsel by not each having
separate counsel for his defense. The court held that the assignment
of a single counsel to represent co-defendants was not prejudicial unless an actual conflict of interest could be shown.32 9 The fact that
counsel directed his efforts primarily to the establishment of a defense
for one of the three defendants was not persuasive in view of the fact
that this defendant "was the only one of his clients who had an),
semblance of defense.","'" Finally, it was argued that while it was in
the interest of one of the defendants to testify, this was in conflict with
the interests of the other two defendants as it made possible the introduction of an out-of-court statement by the testifying defendant which
was incriminating as to the other defendants. 33t The court was unimpressed by this argument, holding that even if the testifying defendant had not taken the stand and the out-of-court statement had
still been introduced, the evidence against them was so overwhelming
as to render the error harmless.332

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

potential mob violence. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the issue
here presented, because the matter had not been raised in a motion for a new
trial.
In a recent decision, Miolen v. State, 6 CRIM. L. REP. 2081 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Sept. 26, 1969), the court held, "While it is true that it is unnecessary for the
trial court to appoint counsel to represent a petitioner in a habeas corpus case
where the petition shows on its face that the petitioner is not entitled to any
relief . . . it is otherwise where an evidentiary hearing is required."
415 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1969).
18 U.S.C. § 751 (1964).
See United States v. Berriel, 371 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1967), cited by the Court.
415 F.2d at 308. Cf. Holland v. Boles, 225 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. AV. Va. 1963).
See Bruton v United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and see text accompanying notes
197 et seq. supra.
See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), and see text accompanying
notes 206-08, supra.
See also the following, yet-unreported decisions: Burris v. State, 5 CRIM. L.
Rn'. 2101 (Tenn. Crim. App., March 25, 1969): "While an attorney has the duty
to point out to a client the dangers inherent in a not guilty plea, it is doubtful
if under any circumstances he shoild influence a client to plead guilty unless
and until a free and voluntary admission of guilt is made to him in confidential
consultation.
If a defendant is not sincere enough in his averments of guilt
to acknowledge his misdeeds to his own attorney, then be should not be urged
to make such an admission to the court, a completely impartial tribunal. Counsel
for the defendant was an officer of the court and he should have made known
to the court the fact that the defendant was insisting on his innocence by
pleading guilty only because of a fear engendered by the attorney that a more
severe penalty would probably be meted out-after a full trial. The trial court
could not and would not have accepted a plea of guilty if aware the defendant
was not sincere in the plea."
1This case involved a juvenile. There is no in-
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In United States v. Wade, 3 33 decided in

485
1967,

the

United States Supreme Court held that since a pretrial identification
lineup is a "critical stage of the prosecution," a suspect is protected
by the right to counsel Under the sixth amendment during such a
proceeding.:.4 Among the more interesting possibilities raised by the
Wade and Gilbert decisions is this: Suppose the police believe X to
be the perpetrator of a robbery and desire an identification by the
victim. X is asked if he wishes to have an attorney at a lineup, and
he responds in the affirnative. The victim comes to the station, and
X, Y and Z are presented in a lineup, with X's attorney observing.
The victim exclaims, "You caught him alright. It's Z." There is no
attorney present representing Z. Does the presence of X's attorney
adequately protect Z's rights, or must the police either avoid putting
anyone in the lineup who could conceivably have committed the crime
other than their prinie suspect for whom counsel is allowed, or allow
an attorney for every party appearing in the lineup? It ma' be observed that there is very little that counsel can do in this situation
:
in any event.3a5
At most, he stands as a witness of the fairness of the
lineup )procedure should any question be raised itsto improper influence of the victim at a later time. On the other hand, it may be
contended that what the Court is requiring is an advocate, not simply
an inipartial observer. :0
Beyond the availability of the attorney as
a witness, should that become necessary, the presence of counsel is
the best assurance of adequate confrontation of the accuser-victim or
witness-when the identification is nade at the trial.3 3 7 The observer
dication in this report whether counsel was appointed or retained.
Williams v. State, 4 CRIN1. L. REP. 2436 (Tenn. Crin. App., Jan. 27, 1969):
is not necessary to appoint counsel for every application [for a writ of habeas
corpus].
If an application raises no claim cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding, it is not necessary to appoint counsel to determine solely if the applicant has some grounds not stated in his original application."
333. 338 U.S. 218 (1967). See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
334. The Illade court, applying the test of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963). held that if the in-court identification had an "independent surce,"
it would be admissible notwithstanding the improper lineup. 388 U.S. at 240.
33 5. Cf. Schimerber v. California, 384 t7.S. 757 (1966), rejecting the right to counsel
during the taking of a blood sample simply because counsel could serve no
useful purpose.
336.
I'Thepresence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself,
operates to assure that the accused's interests will be protected consistently with
our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.* 388 U.S. at 227. Cf. Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
337. "Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not
in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at the trial,
and since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a
meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the
post- indictnsent lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was
'as much entitled to such aid . . . as at the trial itself.' - 388 U.S. at 236-37.
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placed alone face-to-i ace with the witness.
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tion."5 a However, Orozco v. Texas3a5 4 clearly established that Miranda
was germane to interrogations transpiring even in the home of the
suspect. Police arrived at the boarding house at which defendant
lived at about four in the morning and arrested him for murder.
Without being advised of his constitutional rights, the defendant was
asked several questions and gave incriminating responses which were
used against him. The Court held that the fact that the questioning
took place on the bed of the defendant did not render the case distinguishable.

An absence of custody was held to render Miranda inapplicable in
United States v. Harris,a - -, where the defendant made incriminating
3 6
statements to his parole officer, and United States v. Norman, 5
where the defendant made incriminating statements while vohmtarily
35 7
appearing before his draft board.
3. Right to Remain Silent. Acknowledging the "absolute constititional right to remain silent,''3 5 the Miranda court in a significant
footnote held that -[t]he prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial
the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of
accusation.'- a 5'' : The application of this mandate arose in State v.
Flanagan3a 6 where an officer testified that after the defendant talked
on the telephone to his lawyer he declared, "Well, I'm not going to
tell you anything further. I don't have anything to say." The court
held that Miranda did not preclude the introduction of the statement
relying on the words, "in the face of accusation. 3 6 1
While the conclusion of the court is supported by a literal reading of this passage front Miranda, it is doubtful that the holding is
reconcilable with the policy objective at stake. Miranda is simply
353. "An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded
by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described
above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter,
the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against interrogation or trickery." 384 U.S. at 461.
354. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
355. 412 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1969).
356. 301 F. Supp. 53 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
357. Miranda likewise has no application to spontaneous confession made in the
absence of interrogation. United States v. DeBose, 410 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1969).
358. Escobeclo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1963).
359. Miranda r. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37. Applied in United States v. Brinson.
411 F.2d 1057
360. 443 S.\V.2d 25
361. "The footnote
mute or asserts
acts, a silence
from which an

(6th Cir. 1969). See 1969 Survey, at 253-54.
(Tenn. 1969). Noted in 37 TEINN. IL. REv. 644 (1970).
sentence we think assails the situation where a defendant remains
his right so to do when questioned about participating in criminal
in the face of accusation or interrogation with respect to crime,
inference Of guilt might he drawn." Id. at 26.
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acknowledging the frequently applied principle that once a constitutional right is recognized a defendant should not be penalized for
availing himself of that right.A62 In the present case, the defendant
has clone no more than assert his intended reliance on what is nnquestionably a constitutional right. If that assertion is being used to
suggest to the jury an inference of guilt, and there would appear no
other reason for the eliciting of this testimony by the prosecution,
then it would seem patently obvious that the defendant has been
penalized for exercising the privilege against self-incrimination. The
privilege and the Miranda mandate are not co-extensive, and the
ability of the court to distinguish the case from certain language in
3 63
that decision does not avoid the broader constitutional issue.
4. Harmless Error. In McClain v. State3 64 it was acknowledged
by the court that statements had been obtained from the defendant
without first properly advising her of her constitutional rights. While
a written statement had been excluded by the trial court, an interrogating officer was permitted to testify as to her oral statements, which
5
were of an exculpatory nature. a 1'
The court held that this evidence
was improperly admitted, but as the defendant chose to take the
stand and testified to the identical facts, the error was harmless. This
would appear to be the first case in which a Tennessee court has held
3 66
a Miranda error harmless. The court relied on Hill v. United States,
a case which is distinguishable as it involved the non-constitutional
question of the admissibility of particular testinony of a witness. While
holding, first, that the testimony was proper, the court further said
there could be no prejudicial error in any event, since the defendant
substantially repeated the testimony when he took the stand. This
situation, unlike the present case. does not raise the issue of selfincriniination, unless the defendant contends that he would not have
taken the stand had it not been necessary to rebut the evidence illegally
362. Sce, e.g.,

Griffin %. California, 380 1'.S. 609 (1965)
(privilege against self-inSimmons %. Iunited States, 390 '.S. 377 (1968) (protection against
illegal search and seizure): United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (right
to trial by jury).
363. The failure to advise a suspect of his right to appointed counsel where he was
not an indigent \was held harmless error in Jackson %. State, 4 CRI.t. L. REr.
2370 (Tenn. Crinm. App., Jan. 24, 1969).
In the yet-unreported case, McGee v. State, 6 CkRIM. L. REP. 2102 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Oct. 2. 1969), the court held that the suspect effectiv'elv waived his rights
hy nodding his head. Galbreath, J., dissented.
364. -145 S.V.2d 942 (Tenn. Crirn. App. 1969).
365,. So intended, but not so taken by the jury or the appellate court. See prior discussion, text accompanying notes 106-08, supra.
ciitination);

366. 363 F.2d 176 (5th Cii. 1966).
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relatively few

cascs have

ap)plied the harmless ciror rile to Miranda violttio11s.368
'
a of ,Mirada to Retrials. In Jetikins v. J)clawarOtf
5. Applic ti
the United States Supreme Court resolved a growing Conflict in the
:
lowe
ttitits
Iy
hIIlg that the iliratda standards were not applicable to ic-trials whertC the irst trial ociui tred 1)i iot to its dIecisioin,
Jitte 13. l96(j.3ai
H.

Guilty Plea

: 7

In Boy)/ilt ). 4j l(batw t - ife petitioner was arrested on a chatge
of aried robbery, a cptital of lIcise. ;outsel was aplpointed to represent him. At his atrraignmnte.
the petitioner plead guilty to all
cotis. Apparentlytie was asked no questions by tlte judge and did
not address the court. A jury was eitpaneled lot the determination of
punishment and sentenced him to death on each of the five indictmenits. The United States Suprece (ourt held that "[iut was error,
plain on the face of' the record, Ior htie trial jtdge to accept petitioner s
o iilty plea Withoutit
a ,ffit t,ttiot showing that it wxas intelligent anid
:
t tat-N7.'3
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l,cs tott v. HcitClersott,t v 4 a plea of guiiltx
toIli
int a state cotrt can onl\; be effective if the actused had the right to
7: assistmce of counsel at the time tile plea was entetred.Y

I. Speed), Trial
The sixtI anten(ltei
nt right to a speedy trial was extended
: 7
; In Smitlh v.Hoe)y
StIc ti osecttiotl in K lopfrt Z,.N tth CaM-oh1tta.

to
: 7

367. see Harrison \. Iniilcd States, 392 f.S. 219 (1968).
368. se . e.g., Soolook %. State. 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968); Guyette %. Statte,
38 P.2d
2-14 (Nev. 1968); State x. (itlcspic,
tO) N.J. Super. 71, 21tl A.2d 21 9 (1968);
Commonlwealth \. Pa ett. 128 Pa. 229. 237 A.2d 209 (1968).
369. 395 1 .S 213.
370..('S
' Note. 36 l
\- L.
1 .R '. 58 (1168).
37 1. The SiptlCeC (oult of "tClinessue hld peC\iousl so held.
Pattei \..State. 221
Teit. 337. 126 S.\V.2d 503 (1968). Murphv %. State, 221 Tenn. 351, -126 SAV.2d
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372. 395 1 S. 238 (1969).
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tinder al state indictment 1for six years btt
had not been brought to trial because he was serving a sentence in a
the petitioner had been

federal penitentiary. The state conceded that had the petitioner been
free lot the period and had repeatedly demanded to lbe brought to
trial. as he had here. tile state would l6C constitutionally obligated to
try hit. Blt. it ar g ned. it was relieved of this dittty because the peot
;Ollt disagreed,
tltenet was itt( atrcert ted. The Unitted States Suptt e
holding Ihat tLme sLate imad a cotstitiutional duty to make a dil igent,
good-aith effort to britg himt beieftC the . . . totit 'ot trial.':(s
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claim a denial of a speed\, trial. even
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:
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the evidence.:a ' " However, tile tight to al fair and itupartial tri afa
a
This
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on his personal
knowledge and conclusions on the impact of adverse
s5

pu~blIicity.3

2. Severancc. The granting of a severance is a matter within the
discretion of the trial judgeasO When the question has arisen, Tennessee courts have been inclined to employ a balancing process, giving due consideration to the interest of the state in maintaining a
single prosecution. : s7 On appeal, the defendant must show not merely
an abuse of discretion but actual prejudice which resulted from the
refusal to grant the severance.3 8 In Hunter v. State as9 the defendants
contended that they had been prejudiced by the denial of a severance
in the following respects: (1) All but one of the prospective jurors
said that he would find it difficult to keep the facts concerning the
nine defendants separate.
(2) The defendants were subject to the
impact of several confessions implicating some of their number and
(3) The rebuttal testimony used to attack the
exonerating others.
credibility of two of' the defendants affected the case against all of
First,
theni. The court found none of the arguments perstiasive.3 9
the court found that the trial court had conscientiously sought to aid
the jurors throughout the trial to sort out the evidence, and the defendants had the benefit of a fair and impartial jury. Second, no
prejudice resulted fron the cross-implications of confessions as each
of them took the stand and was available for cross-examination by the
co-defendants.3 t TIre jury was also carefully instructed on the limitations on the use of the confessions. Finally, the court found no
38:. "The trial judgc has 110 judicial power as contradistinguished from the power of
the law. His discietion is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the
proper course prescribed b%law with the consequent duty to follow that course.
His will as a person is not to he done, but rather the will of the law." 294
F. Supp. at 620.
386. Hunter %:.Srate. 440 S.\V.2d I (Tenn. 1969). Cited: Stallard v. State, 187 Tenn.
418, 215 S.W%.2d 807 (194t8): I omlin s. State, 207 Tenn. 281, 339 S.V.2d 10 (1960);
Ellis v. State. 218 Tenn. 297, 403 S.W.2d 293 (1966). See also Thompson v. State,
171 Tenn. 156, 101 S.\.2d 467 (1937): l)ykes %. State, 194 Tcnn. 477, 253 S.V.2d
535 (1952).

387. "The State. as well as the person accused, is cntitled to have its iights protected.
and
iwhen
persons are charged jointly with a single crime, we think the State
is entitled to ha\'e the fact of guilt determined and punishment assessed in a
single trial, unless to do so would unfairly prejudice the rights of the defendant."
AVoodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 539. 51 S.V.2d 843, 845 (1932).
388. W\oodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S.W.2d 843 (1932); Turner %. State, 187
Tienn. 309. 213 S.V.2d 281 (1948); Stallard v. State, 187 Terin. 418, 215 S.AW.2d
807 (1948); Stanley v. State, 189 Tenn. 110, 222 S.AV.2d 384 (1949).
389. 1,10 S.\V.2d 1 (Tenn. 1969).
390. There would appear to be no Tennessee cases in which the trial
found to have abused his discretion in this matter.
"391. Se, text acconmpanying notes 195 r/ seq. su/,ra.

judge was
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substance to the argument that the testimony of a rebuttal witness
had prejudiced the case of other defendants. 3 9 2
In Moore v. Russell,3 93 where the defendant was one of several
charged with a brutal jailhouse murder, the court indicated that a
severance should be carefully considered by the trial judge where the
defendant was a misdemeanant and he would be surrounded at his
trial by several co-defendants, all of whom were charged with felonies,
two with murder.
3.

Consolidation of Offenses. In Burum v. State3 94 the defendant

had been tried by the same -jury on two separate indictments, one
containing three counts concerning breaking and entering of a dwelling house, the other containing three counts dealing with the burglary
of an entirely separate business house. The jury convicted the defendant under the first indictment and acquitted him as to the second.
He argued that it was error to consolidate the two cases, submitting
that separate attorneys had been appointed to represent him in the
two instances, the defense theories were different and incompatible,
there was no connection between the cases, they occurred some twenty
miles apart, there were no witnesses or material facts common to both
cases, and it would be impossible for the jury to isolate the evidence
submitted by the prosecuti6n in reference to one case from that submitted in inference to the other.
The court concluded that the defendant's argument was meritorious,
relying principally on Bruce v. State,3 95 where a conviction of receiving
stolen property was reversed because the defendant had been charged
with the unrelated offense of assault and battery at the same trial.
Distinguished were Hardin v. State,396 where the charges of second
degree murder and driving while intoxicated arose out of the same
facts, and Bullard v. State,3 97 where the defendant was convicted at
one trial of the separate offenses of violating the Bad Check Law and
public drunkenness. There apparently the court felt that because of
the unrelatedness of the two offenses and the fact that one of them was

392. A vigorous dissent by Humphreys, J., suggested that the illogic of the sentences
handed down by the jury was evidence of their inability to properly associate
the evidence with the various defendants.
393. 294 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
394. 445 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
395. 213 Tenn. 666, 378 S.W.2d 758 (1964).
396. 210 Tenn. 116, 355 S.W.2d 105 (1961).
397. 208 Tenn. 641, 348 S.W.2d 303 (1961).
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3 8
a petty misdemeanor the defendant could not have been prejndiced.
In the present case the court felt that the likely confusion in the minds
of the jurors as to the relevancy of the evidence submitted by the
3 99
prosecution to the various counts resulted in prejudicial error.

4 '
4. Participation of Defendant. In Rivera v. Statc Iu the court held
that the appearance of the defendant before the jury in handcuffs
would not amount to a denial of due process where the defendant
had a history of violent resistance to law enforcement officers. In
fact, the court determined that none of the jurors had seen the defendant handcuffed but indicated that it would not have been ini40
proper if he had been kept handcuffed for the entire trial. ' In
'
United States v. King4i 2 the court held that an admonishment of the
defendant by the trial judge for his tardy appearance in court was
harmless.
While requtiring the defendant to perform various acts at his trial
45
Under some circumstances he
does not constitute self-incrimination, '
to a fair trial. 40 4 United
the
right
of
a
denial
may successfully claim
States v. Doremrus4°1 held that having the defendant execute a handwriting exemplar "had no tendency to disgrace or insult" him.

398. The distinction between this case and the Bullard decision is extremely fragile.
Bruce dismisses Bullard as an application of harmless error rule, but nowhere in
Bullard does the court concede that there was error at all. In light of the
principal case it may be concluded that greater reliance may he accorded
Bruce than Bullard.
399. "In separate trials, of course it is elementary that evidence relating exclusively
to the offenses charged in one of these discrete indictments would not have been
admissible in a trial upon the other. Under this record, there can be little
doubt that the jury, confronted with all the evidence and the testimony of a
number of witnesses relating to both cases very understandably was most likely
bewildered and puzzled and simply yielded to the temptation to conclude that
where there is so much smoke there is bound to be some fire, and thus
arbitrarily selected one offense for conviction out of the three separate offenses
charged in each of the two separate indictments." 445 SYV.2d at 949. See
generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 841 (1958).
400. 443 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
401. See Poe v. State, 78 Tenn. 673 (1882); State %. Meadows, 215 Tenn. 668, 389
S.W.2d 256 (1965).
402. 415 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1968).
403. See generally 2 VHARION'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 660 (Anderson ed. 1955);
8 ,\IGIORE oN EVIDENCE § 2265 (McNaugton Rev. 1961). Cf. Stokes v. State, 64
Tenn. 619 (1875), holding it improper to require a defendant to make a footprint in a pan of mud before the jury. The later decision of Dennis v. State,
198 Tenn. 325, 279 S.W.2d 512 (1955.), distinguished Stokes where the defendant
had chosen to take the stand.
404. "A trial is not a dramatic spectacle and to require the performance of indecent
acts as requiring demonstration that would have a tendency to degrade, humiliate, insult or disgrace the defendant would deprive him of his constitutional
guarantee to a fair and impartial trial." State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 92, 407 P.2d
59, 64 (1965).
405. 414 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1969).
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5. Trial by Jury: (a) Right to. In 1968 in Duncan v. United
States40 6 the United States Supreme Court applied the right to trial
by jury of the sixth amendment to the states at least where the potential punishment was two years' imprisonment. Similarly, in Bloom
v. Illinois4 1'7 the right to trial by jury in criminal contempt proceedings was recognized where the actual sentence was two years. 40s In
Duncan the Court indicated that the right would probably not be
available for "petty" offenses where the punishment did not exceed
six months. Without expressly so holding, language in Frank v. United
States411 lends support to the belief that the Court has determined that
six months is the line of detnarcation.41 ° In Frank, however, the petitioner, cited for criminal contempt, was convicted, but rather than
being sentenced was placed on probation for three years. The Court
4t 1
held that such a disposition did not require a right to trial by jury.
(b) Iproper Influence. In the 1965 decision, Turner v. Louisiana,4 ' two deputy sheriffs who were the principal witnesses for the
prosecution were also the custodians of the jury during the three-day
trial. While it was clear that the deputies had freely mingled with
the jury during the course of the trial, there was no indication that
they had even talked to any member of the jury about the case. The
Court, however, felt that a crucial matter in the case was the jury's
determination of the credibility of these two witnesses, and the impact
of this direct association would go far to offset the impact of any
cross-examination during the trial. This would be true if the jury
were allowed to associate with any of the witnesses; the possibility
was compounded by the official capacity of the parties in question.
Thus the decision was reversed and the case remanded. Analogous facts
were presented in Shepherd v. Wingo,413 but the court distinguished

406.
407.
408.
419.
-110.

391 U.S. 145 (1968).
391 U.S. 194 (1968).
See 1968 Survey at 261.
395 t'.S. 147 (1969).
The government conceded that a jury trial would have been mandatory if the
petitioner had received a sentence for contempt in excess of six months.
411. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that the
decision opened the door to the imposition of oppressive conditions of probation
for extended time periods. The conditions in the present case were as follows:
"Petitioner is required to make monthly reports to his probation officer, associate
only with law abiding persons, maintain reasonable hours, work regularly, report
all changes to his probation officer, and not leave the probation district without
the permission of his probation officer." 395 U.S. at 151 n.6. Justice Black also
dissen ted.
412. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
413. 414 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1969).
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Turner on the basis of the findings of the lower court that the fraternization with the jurors had not been of comparable degree and the
414
credibility of the deputy had not been as crucial to the case.
K. Punishment
1. Cruel and Unusual. Rarely will a court interlope into matters
which come within the designation of "prison discipline. ' ' 415 Judicial
41 6
intervention is a possibility where the circumstances are extreme.
In Hancock v. Avery 41 7 the plaintiff contended that his solitary confinement, as authorized by a Tennessee statttte, 418 amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment. The environment in which the plaintiff
was confined was alleged to be quite austere, 419 and his daily routine
restricted to a level below the minimally tolerable levels of civilized
living.42 0 It was countered by the defendant prison officials that these

414. The court, however, noted that the petitioner could renew his petition for writ
of habeas corpus if he could allege facts comparable to Turner. See also Parker
v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
415. See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) (limiting number of persons
prisoner could correspond with); Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1965)
(limiting correspondence course materials prisoner could keep in cell); Walker
v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969) (restrictions on activities of Black
Muslims). Cf. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (prisoner should
be allowed to subscribe to Negro magazines). And see Barnett v. Rodgers, 410
410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (concerning request by Muslims of one pork-free
diet each day).
416. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), holding the use of the
strap for disciplinary purposes cruel and unusual punishment.
417. 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
418. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-707 (1955): "Solitary confinement for violation of rulesIf any convict neglects or refuses to perform the labor assigned him or wilfully
injures any of the materials, implements, or tools, or engages in conversation
with another convict, or in any other manner violates any of the regulations of
the penitentiary, he may be punished by solitary confinement for a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days for each offense, at the discretion of the warden, or
person acting in his place."
419. "The dry cell in which petitioner is confined measures approximately five b%
eight feet, is of concrete construction, and has a single steel door.
The cell
is unlighted save for dim artificial light which seeps into the cell from the
outside corridor through two small slit screens in the cell door. Plaintiff alleges
that he is thus being deprived of adequate light and ventilation for the entire
duration of his stay in the cell.
"The interior of the cell is devoid of furnishings except that there is at the
rear of the cell a hole constructed to receive bodily wastes. There is, however,
no mechanism within the cell to allow an occupant to flush waste material from
the hole. Rather, the flushing operation is controlled by a guard operating a
flushing device located outside of the cell. This operation is carried out only
five times every twenty-four hours, three times during daylight hours and twice
at night.
As a result of this infrequent flushing, objectionable odors often
permeate the cell." 301 F. Supp. at 788-89.
420. "Plaintiff has been forced to remain in the dry cell without any means of
cleaning his hands, body or teeth. He is denied the use of soap, towel, toilet
paper, and other hygienic materials. No means have been provided which would
enable him to clean any part of his body at anytime. He is fed three times a
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maximum security conditions were justified, because the plaintiff had

twice attempted suicide, was implicated in the stabbing of a prison
guard, and had twice attempted escape from less secure cells. It was
submitted that the matter came within the discretion of the prison
administrators. The court was disinclined to agree that the conduct
was non-justiciable when allegations of such oppressive treatment were
made, and noted that maximum security procedures had come within
judicial cognizance in the past. 42 1 It concluded that "requiring a
prisoner to live, eat and sleep in such degrading circumstances does
violence to civilized standards of luman decency,' 42 2 and that such
practices should be enjoined.
2. Involuntary Servitude. The practice of requiring convicted persons to serve jail terms in lieu of payment of fines and costs has come
4 2 -3
Three possiunder increasing judicial scrutiny in recent years.
amount as
a
specified
bilities arise. (1)The defendant may be fined
part of his sentence, and upon failure to pay the amount, the fine
42 4
is converted into an equivalent number of days of incarceration.
This would appear to present no constitutional problem unless the
total period of incarceration exceeds the maximum term imposable for
(2) The defendant may be charged with jail fees
the offense. 4 2 5
accumulated while awaiting trial. Incarceration to work off such debts
has been held unconstitutional as a deprivation of equal protection,
since they would not be incurred by a defendant capable of posting
(3) The defendant may be charged with court costs accruing
bail. 42
from his trial. The TFennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found
nothing uconstitutional in requiring a defendant to work off these

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

426.

day, a slice of bread at breakfast and supper, and a regular meal at noon.
I[he noon meal is folded into a paper container and given to plaintiff by sliding
it through a small crack in the cell door. It is apparent from the foregoing facts
that plaintiff is thus forced to handle and eat his food without any provision
for cleanliness or even minimal sanitary conditions.
l)uring the term of his confinement in the dry cell, plaintiff has not been
permitted to wear clothing of any kind and is being forced to remain in the
cell entirely nude. As a result, he is forced to sleep on the bare concrete floor.
Even though he has requested a blanket, its use has been denied him." Id.
at 789.
Jordon v. Fitzharris. 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Graham v. Willingham
384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
301 F. Supp. at 792.
'ee 1968 S vey at 233-35.
The rate has now been raised from two dollars a day to five dollars a day.
TFENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1223 (Supp. 1969).
Sawver v. District of Colnnbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. App. 1968); State v. Allen,
104 'N.J. Super, 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969): People v. Seffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218
N.E.2d 686. 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1968). But see People %'.Williams, 41 Ill.511, 244
N.E.2d 197 (1969): Vade v. Carsley, 221 So.2d 729 (Miss. 1969).
State ex rel.Hawkins v. luttrell, 221 Trenn. 32, 424 S.W.2d 189 (1968).
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costs in Wilson v. Sloan. 42 7 However, a recent federal decision, Anderson v. Ellington,42 8 has gone the other way. The plaintiff there sought
an injunction against his incarceration for the non-payment of court
costs in the amount of $892.38. The court held in favor of the defendant on the ground that the imprisonment constituted involuntary
servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment. 42 9 The crux of
the problem was whether the amount in issue should be considered a
part of the punishment, as the state argued, or more in the nature of
a debt, in which instance the thirteenth amendment would be relevant. The court found that the state substantively and procedurally
had not treated costs as a part of punishment, because (1) the statutes
defining various crimes and the general penalty sections did not include
costs as a part of punishment, (2) costs were not fixed by the jury
in their determination of punishment, (3) an executive pardon does
not extend to the costs, 430 and (4) the costs bear no reasonable relationship to the offense committed. Finally, the court considered the
argument of the state that non-imprisonnient would deny equal protection to defendants who were capable of paying costs as the), would
incur an additional penalty. To this it was countered that the courts
have the same power to enforce judgments for costs by execution in
43 a
criminal cases as in civil cases.
L.

Double Jeopardy

In Benton v. Maryland,432 the United States Supreme Court applied
the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy to the states.
The petitioner had been convicted of burglary and acquitted of larceny. On appeal, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded
for retrial. At the second trial, the petitioner was again charged with
larceny and burglary, and this time he was found guilty on both
charges. Reversing the long-standing holding of Palko v. Connecti4 3
Cltt'
.3 the Court
held that the protection against double jeopardy
427. 438 SAV.2d 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968) (litigation taxes cannot be worked off,
however).
428. 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
429. It would appear that only one other court has previously so held. Wright v.
Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968). See also Galbreath, J., dissenting,
in Wilson v. Sloan, 438 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
430. Spellings v. State, 99 Tenn. 201, 41 S.W.2d 444 (1897); State ex rel. Barnes v.
Garrett, 135 Tenn. 617, 188 S.W. 58 (1915); State v. Hill, 43 Tenn. 98 (1866);
Smith v. State, 74 Tenn. 637 (1881).
431. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3205 (1955).
432. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
433. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" and therefore
must be applied with full force to state prosecutions. As to whether
the procedure here came within the aegis of the protection, the Court
43 4
where the analogous situation in
turned to Green v. United States,
federal court was held to constitute double jeopardy.
43 5
the application
In a companion case, North Carolina v. Pearce,

of the protection against double jeopardy was raised where the petitioner, following a reversal of his conviction, received a greater
sentence on retrial than he had received at his first trial. The Court
held that the increased sentence vitiated neither the protection against
double jeopardy nor the equal protection clause. It did, however, raise
a due process question where the sentencing judge had in effect
43 6
Thus,
penalized the defendant for exercising a right to appeal.
the Court concluded, "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so
must affirmatively appear.'' 4 37 In a separate issue, the Court held
that the protection against double jeopardy "absolutely requires that
ptunishment already exacted must be fully 'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense.' '438
4

decided prior to Benton and Pearce, would appear distinguishable. There the defendant obtained a reversal of a
conviction of grand larceny and a sentence of four years. On retrial,
he was again indicted for larceny and, for the first time, charged as
an habitual criminal. 4 4" He was convicted on both counts and received
three to five years for grand larceny and life imprisonment on the
Brown

V.

State, 39

434. 354 t.S. 184 (1957).
435. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
436. Cf. t'hited States v. Jackson, 390 I.S. 570 (1968).
437. 395 U.S. at 726. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the
And the factual data upon which
time of the original sentencing proceeding.
the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the
constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may he fully reviewed on
appeal." Id.
In light of the holding. Rivera N. State. 443 SA..2d 675 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1969), Would appear to be clearly incorrect, subject to the question of retroactive
application of Pemoce..See also U1nited States v. King. 415 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1969).
It will be noted that the focus of attention in Pearce is on judge-imposed
sentences. A yet-unreported decision of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
has held Ilearce inapplicable where the harsher sentence was imposed by a jury.
Pinkard v. Henderson, 6 CRIM. 1.. RFI'. 2148 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct. 28, 1969).
"Tosame effect. s'e Branch %. State, 445 S.W.2d 756 (Tlex. Crim. App. 1969).
138. 395 t.S. at 718.
,139. 15 S.V.2d 669 (Tein.

Crim. App. 1969).

140. TENN. Coot ANN. § 40-2801

(1955).
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habitual criminal charge. While on the authority of Pearce, the sentence for larceny may be reducible to a maximum of four years, no
objection would appear available for the life sentence, as the defendant
had never been placed in jeopardy on this charge. Presumably, even
if the first larceny conviction had not been overturned, the state
could subsequently have convicted the defendant as an habitual criminal and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

